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ABSTRACT 
AN EXAMINATION OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES  
OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL EQUALIZATION PROGRAMS 
 
By 
Dmitry Shishkin 
August 2007 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Jorge L. Martinez-Vazquez 
Major Department: Economics 
 
While the major goal of intergovernmental equalization transfers is the pursuit of 
equity, there is also a number of unintended consequences produced by equalization 
programs. In this dissertation we analyze the negative effect of equalization on the size of 
factors that are either used to measure the equalized jurisdictions’ fiscal capacity in gap-
filling equalization programs or are taxed with the purpose of further redistribution 
among jurisdictions in tax base sharing programs. 
We propose a theoretical framework in which the comparative statics analysis 
shows how equalization programs can induce substitution effect in the representative 
individual’s consumption bundle via changes in the perceived price of the good that is 
associated with the size of the factor used to measure the equalized jurisdictions’ fiscal 
capacity or taxed with the purpose of further redistribution among the jurisdictions. As 
the representative individual changes consumption of this good, the size of the factor also 
changes, resulting either in a reduction of the budget revenue collections or in the size of 
tax bases in the equalized jurisdictions. 
 xi
In the empirical part of this dissertation we examine the existence and economic 
significance of these effects using two cases of equalization programs. First, we examine 
the adverse effect of the equalization programs on revenue collections in Russia’s regions 
where regional governments redistributed resources among their constituent 
municipalities based on the size of their actual revenue collections. Second, we examine 
the adverse effect of the tax base sharing program in the Twin Cities Metropolitan area of 
Minnesota on the size of commercial and industrial property where this property is taxed 
at a uniform rate and then reassigned to the municipalities in the inverse proportion to the 
size of their per capita real property. In both cases our empirical results support the 
hypothesis that the equalization programs adversely affect the size of the factors that are 
used to measure the equalized jurisdictions’ fiscal capacity or that are taxed with the 
purpose of further redistribution among jurisdictions in tax base sharing programs. 
.
 xii
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Intergovernmental equalization transfers are an important part of the fiscal 
decentralization system in many countries in the world. They are present both in 
federations and unitary states,1 and affect regional as well as local governments. The 
major drive behind these programs is the pursuit of equity, which means that the 
resources are redistributed from better-off to worse-off jurisdictions to make sure that 
they all have comparable fiscal capacities to provide a given level of public service.2 
Another justification of equalization is that it can eliminate inefficient migration in 
decentralized fiscal systems. 
Equalization is known to produce two types of unintended effects: it might affect 
the tax rates imposed by equalized jurisdictions, and it might affect their revenue 
collection effort or their willingness to attract and maintain the tax bases. 
In this dissertation we address the latter set of problems, i.e., disincentives that 
negatively affect the size of factors that are used to measure equalized jurisdictions’ fiscal 
capacity or are taxed with the purpose of further redistribution among jurisdictions in tax 
base sharing programs. We propose a theoretical framework in which the comparative 
statics analysis shows how these disincentives take place. We use this framework to show 
how gap-filling equalization grants can change the relative prices of the goods that are 
associated with the size of factors used to measure jurisdictions’ fiscal capacity as these 
                                                 
1 For example, such federations as Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Russia, and Spain, and 
such unitary states as Japan, Scandinavian countries, and Ukraine extensively use equalization programs. 
Some supranational organizations like European Union also redistribute resources from its more 
economically prosperous to its less developed members. 
2 There is a close analogy between these programs and redistribution of income between 
individuals. 
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prices are perceived by the residents of the jurisdictions, and how these changes in 
perceived prices can induce substitution effects in the residents’ consumption bundles. 
We also use this framework to show how tax base sharing programs produce similar 
substitution effects in the residents’ consumption bundles reducing the size of the factors 
that are taxed with the purpose of further redistribution among jurisdictions. 
In the empirical part of this dissertation we examine the existence and economic 
significance of these effects using two cases of equalization programs: first, the 
equalization programs in Russia’s regions where regional governments redistribute 
resources among their municipalities based on the size of their actual revenue collections, 
and, second, the case of tax base sharing program in the Twin Cities Metropolitan area in 
Minnesota where commercial and industrial tax bases are taxed at a uniform rate and 
proceeds are redistributed in the inverse proportion to the size of their per capita real 
property values. 
In both cases our empirical results support the hypothesis that the equalization 
programs adversely affect the size of the factors that are used to measure the equalized 
jurisdictions’ abilities to raise budget revenues, or which are taxed with the purpose of 
further redistribution among jurisdictions in tax base sharing programs. 
The study of these disincentives and their economic significance is important 
because, as fiscal decentralization initiatives continue to spread across developing and 
transitional countries in all regions of the world, there are more and more countries that 
are introducing or seek to introduce equalization transfers to address the problems of 
horizontal fiscal imbalances generated in their decentralization systems. If equalization 
induces economically significant effects in the size of factors used as measures of 
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jurisdictions’ fiscal capacity and/or taxed for the purpose of further redistribution, these 
can have negative consequences on the delivery of the publicly provided goods and on 
overall revenue mobilization, as well as on local development and overall economic 
growth, and can in general create welfare losses. These welfare losses could be measured 
and compared to the welfare gains resulting from equalization programs, using a 
methodology similar to those in Watson (1986) and Wilson (2003); however, this kind of 
analysis is left for future research. 
For the purpose of this work we define an equalization scheme as a flow of 
money that is provided to jurisdictions in an inverse proportion to some measure of their 
ability to raise budget revenues, which may or may not be normalized by their 
expenditure needs. In other words, if jurisdictions A and B have identical expenditure 
needs, the one with a smaller ability to raise budget revenues would receive a larger 
amount of equalization transfers. Also, if jurisdictions A and B have identical abilities to 
raise budget revenues, the one with larger expenditure needs would receive a larger 
amount of equalization transfers. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Although there is a sizable literature on equalization grants and measurement of 
fiscal capacity (Martinez-Vazquez and Boex 2002), there is a much smaller literature on 
the disincentive effects of equalization and even fewer papers that  have investigated the 
central issue of this dissertation: how equalization schemes may affect the variables or 
bases used to measure fiscal capacity3 of the equalized jurisdictions. 
One of the most known and intuitive effects resulting from equalization is a 
negative effect on the revenue collections that takes place when equalization is based on 
these as a measure of jurisdictions’ fiscal capacity. Martinez-Vazquez and Boex (2001) 
argue that in 1990s the equalization transfers that were provided to Russia’s regions 
according to current or base year revenue collections as a measure of fiscal capacity 
reduced their incentives to collect revenues. According to Martinez-Vazquez and Boex 
(2001), this effect was even stronger at the local level where local governments routinely 
saw a large percentage of additional revenues clawed back by regional governments,4 
which encouraged them to hide fiscal resources rather than to increase tax collections. 
Similarly, Baretti (2002) et al. show that the equalization system in Germany that 
distributes transfers among the states based on their actual revenue collections (i.e., 
providing larger transfers to the states that collect smaller amounts of tax revenue) works 
as a tax on a state’s tax revenue. They introduce a concept of a marginal tax rate of this 
                                                 
3 Following Martinez and Boex (2002) I define fiscal capacity as the potential revenues that can be 
obtained from the tax bases assigned to the subnational government if an average level of effort (by 
national standards) is applied to those bases. 
4 As we show later in this dissertation, revenue clawback (i.e. the offsetting changes in the size of 
equalization transfers in response to the changes in the size of jurisdictions’ own revenues) is an inevitable 
result of equalization based on actual revenue collections as a measure of fiscal capacity. 
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kind, defining it as the fraction of additional tax revenue in the state taken away from the 
region there, and show that higher marginal tax rates encourages German states to reduce 
their tax enforcement activity, which leads to lower tax revenues. 
Equalization systems that are carefully designed, such as the representative tax 
system, can be free from this kind of disincentives as it estimates fiscal capacity of the 
equalized jurisdictions to raise budget revenues not according to the amounts of their 
actual tax collections, but according to the size of their tax bases multiplied by 
appropriate average tax rates (Martinez-Vazquez and Boex 2002). In fact, switching to 
another set of parameters raises the question of whether in their own turn these 
parameters could be affected by the policies of the governments or by the behavior of the 
residents of the equalized jurisdictions. 
Addressing this question, Courchene and Beavis (1973) evaluate the “new” 
federal-provincial equalization program in Canada5 that distributed transfers based on the 
size of provinces’ tax bases and the average tax rates for sixteen provincial revenue 
sources. 
They show that this kind of equalization system encourages provinces to change 
their tax rates up or down depending on the relative size of their per capita tax bases: the 
provinces that have larger than average per capita tax base for some revenue source are 
encouraged to lower their tax rates imposed on this tax base, and the provinces that have 
smaller than average per capita tax base for some revenue source are encouraged to raise 
their tax rates imposed on this tax base. By doing so the jurisdictions affect the average 
                                                 
5 This equalization program replaced the one that was in use in Canada in 1962-67. 
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tax rates and increase the size of the transfers that they are receiving. This effect is 
stronger for those provinces that have a larger share in the national-wide tax base.  
Also Courchene and Beavis show that the equalization system would have 
punished some Canadian provinces if the size of their tax bases had increased. For 
example, according to their estimations if Nova Scotia increased its tax base in 1968-69 
by five percent, it would have lost $1,582 million in transfers while only gaining $1,467 
in own revenues, suffering not only a decrease in the amount of transfers, but also a 
decrease in the total amount of revenues. 
Courchene and Beavis offer some options to modify the equalization program to 
reduce the opportunity for provinces to affect the amount of transfers that they receive, 
but they neither provide a formal model to show how the opportunities could be 
transformed into changes in the provinces’ policy decisions nor explain what mechanisms 
provinces could use to affect the size of their tax bases. 
In a later work, Courchene (1994) argues that equalization might discourage 
recipient jurisdictions from developing new revenue sources, as additional revenues are 
implicitly taken away through the equalization process. Dahlby and Wilson (1994) take 
into account the possible elasticity of tax bases with respect to the changes in the tax rates 
as they are concerned with equalization of the social marginal cost of raising revenue 
across all revenues (the Ramsey rule for the nation) and show how this goal could be 
achieved with optimal equalization grants. 
In a very important work for the topic of this dissertation Smart (1998) shows that 
under conditions of representative system of taxation the equalized jurisdictions have an 
incentive to suppress the size of their tax bases and increase the amount of equalization 
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transfers by raising their tax rates. Smart not only points to the opportunity for the 
equalized jurisdictions to affect the amount of transfers that they receive when the size of 
their tax bases changes, but also refers to a particular mechanism that they could use (i.e., 
imposing higher tax rates) and presents a formal model that shows how these incentives 
transfer into changes of the jurisdictions’ behavior. 
In a later work, Smart (2002) says that, despite the potential importance of these 
incentives, there is little hard evidence that equalization programs have actually 
influenced provincial decisions about tax rates and tax bases. Smart refers to an anecdotal 
evidence of the protracted negotiations over development of the Voisey’s Bay nickel 
deposit as an illustrative example of equalization affecting provincial policy decision. 
According to this evidence, the government of Newfoundland and Labrador were not 
willing to allow the project to get started as the equalization formula effectively 
eliminated the benefit that they would receive from the royalties paid by the project. 
The latter example refers to a different mechanism that jurisdictions can use when 
facing disincentives produced by equalization programs, i.e., exercising a direct control 
over tax bases. Accordingly, in his survey of the role of intergovernmental equalization 
transfers, Boadway (2004) considers two sorts of ways that regions can affect the size of 
their tax bases: one, by imposing high tax rates that would suppress the size of relatively 
elastic tax bases, and, another, by directly controlling their tax bases, like for example in 
the resource sector where regions can affect the extent of resource development, the latter 
effect, he argues, being even more powerful than the former. 
There is a number of articles that study another type of equalization programs–so-
called tax base sharing, which is more common in the U.S. at local level (Fischel 1975, 
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1976; Reschovsky 1980, 1982; Fox 1982). Tax base sharing differs from the 
representative tax system as it does not employ the gap-filling mechanism–rather it pools 
the revenues from particular tax bases of the jurisdictions involved into the program and 
then redistributes the revenues among them according to some formula, but its major 
purpose is the same–to redistribute resources from municipalities with larger tax bases to 
municipalities with smaller tax bases. Thus, potentially the program could negatively 
affect the size of the tax bases in the equalized jurisdictions. 
The largest program of this kind both in terms of geographical area covered and 
the amount of tax base that is shared is the fiscal disparities program that shares 
commercial-industrial tax base within the Twin Cities metropolitan area of Minnesota, 
and not surprisingly it has been scrutinized by researchers. 
The first time the effect of tax base sharing on the size of the equalized 
jurisdictions’ tax bases was addressed by Fischel (1975, 1976). While analyzing fiscal 
and environmental considerations in the location of firms in suburban communities, he 
argues that the sharing of commercial and industrial tax bases of each community with 
other communities throughout the metropolitan area will result in a situation when 
communities are less willing to permit businesses to locate inside their borders, which 
eventually reduces metropolitan output, employment and income. 
Fischel (1975) presents a model of a market for business location based on the 
exchange between residents of communities and firms, and discusses the effect that the 
sharing of commercial and industrial tax bases performed by a metropolitan government 
would have on this exchange mechanism. Fischel argues that the tax base sharing as well 
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as the centralization of local services would result in a reduction of number of firms 
located in the localities.  
In a later work, Fischel (1976) discusses the economic consequences of the 
metropolitan tax base sharing, using the example of the “Metropolitan Fiscal Disparities 
Act” that was passed by the Minnesota State Legislature in 1971. This act applies to 
communities in seven counties of the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area and provides that 
forty percent of the increase in commercial and industrial property over those in 1971 
should be withdrawn from the tax base of local municipalities and transferred to a 
metropolitan authority that taxes it at a uniform rate and redistributes the revenues among 
communities in grants with the amounts inversely related to the per capita market value 
of real property in the communities. 
To analyze the effect of the tax base sharing plan, Fischel considers a simplified 
model of it: a scheme that withdraws taxing authority over all existing and future 
commercial and industrial property in the community, taxes the property at a uniform rate 
and redistributes the revenues among the communities on an equal dollar per capita basis. 
According to Fischel, the market for the business location would not work under 
the assumptions of this model because they eliminate the fiscal benefits that represent the 
shadow price of the environmental quality of the neighborhood that is reduced by the 
presence of the firms. Following the same logic, he says that despite the fact that the 
Fiscal Disparities Act leaves some fiscal benefits to residents, it still reduces the price of 
environmental quality inducing the residents to increase its consumption. The increased 
consumption of the environmental quality would reduce the presence of the firms in the 
communities. 
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The major insight of Fischel’s work for this dissertation is that it provides a model 
of business location which is the basis for the analysis in the theory section. There, we 
elaborate on his argument related to the effect of tax base sharing on the number of firms 
located in the equalizing area, providing a more formal explanation, and test empirically 
the effect of the tax base sharing on the size of the tax bases in the Twin Cities 
Metropolitan area. 
There are several other works that study the consequences of the Twin Cities 
Fiscal Disparities program. Reschovsky (1980) concludes that tax base sharing is unlikely 
to have a significant effect on metropolitan development patterns, which in his 
interpretation means that it is unlikely that the plan would stimulate new commercial-
industrial growth in the central cities. This dissertation concentrates on a different aspect 
of potential changes in metropolitan development patterns resulting from tax base 
sharing: we study its effect on the shared tax bases inside the metropolitan area visa-vis 
tax bases outside its borders. Our findings are in agreement with Fox (1981) who argues 
that income redistribution within the metropolitan area might push citizens and business 
firms outside its borders as they would try to avoid the redistribution. 
Besides the negative effect on the size of the tax bases resulting from the 
equalization transfers formula, there is always a possibility that the taxes needed to raise 
resources for redistribution in the form of transfers will suppress the tax bases even 
further. For example, in the case of Twin Cities Fiscal disparities program the area wide 
taxation of commercial and industrial property tax bases is a part of the tax base sharing 
program. 
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Watson (1986) and Wilson (2003) measure welfare losses and compare them with 
welfare gains resulting from equalization programs. The results of this dissertation could 
be used to enhance this kind of studies, as we put forward a more elaborate research 
related to the potential welfare losses from equalization. These authors make a rather 
crude assumption about welfare losses resulting from equalization taking into account 
only administrative cost and deadweight loss resulting from taxation that is necessary to 
finance the equalization programs. 
There are two other works that do not directly address the incentive effects of 
equalization, but are important for our empirical analysis of equalization on the 
incentives of municipalities in Russia’s regions. These are Zhuravskaya (2000) and 
Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya (2002) who estimate fiscal incentives faced by 
municipalities in Russia, associating these incentives with the offsetting effect of the 
changes in regional transfers in response to the changes in the municipalities’ own 
revenues (clawback.) These two works are important for my research because they 
address the issue of fiscal disincentives in Russia’s regions, which according to our view 
are produced by equalization practices of regional governments toward their 
municipalities. Both works show that fiscal incentives faced by municipalities in Russia 
were rather weak, which we interpret as a sign of extensive equalization practices. 
A main problem with these two works is that the term “own revenues” is defined 
differently and neither of the authors presents a clear argument why own revenues should 
be defined in a particular way. In the empirical section of this dissertation we show the 
problems that are associated with either approach and develop an approach of our own 
that allows us to measure fiscal incentives consistently when the sharing rates from 
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shared revenue sources assigned to equalized jurisdictions’ budgets are not fixed and 
change from year to year. We use this approach further in the dissertation to estimate 
fiscal incentives faced by municipalities in Russia’s regions and show how these 
incentives affect the tax effort in the regions. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE THEORETICAL MODEL
The objective of the model is to uncover the fundamental conditions under which 
gap-filling equalization mechanisms (including “incentive compatible” ones, based on 
fiscal capacity as opposed to actual revenue collections) as well as the tax base sharing 
schemes may induce unwanted substitution effects on the factors that are used as 
measures of equalized jurisdictions’ fiscal capacity or as shared tax bases. 
The key point of the theoretical analysis in this section is the notion that most of 
the parameters that could be used to estimate a jurisdictions’ ability to raise budget 
revenues, including most importantly the size of their tax bases, are not exogenously 
determined. Rather, they either represent goods that are consumed by residents directly 
(e.g., publicly provided goods or private housing) or are factors that produce externalities 
that affect the size of the consumed goods (e.g., businesses with positive or negative 
externalities). Similarly, the tax bases that are shared through the tax base sharing 
programs are not exogenously determined, but directly or indirectly relate to the goods 
consumed by the residents. 
If the residents’ choices related to consumption of these goods could be affected 
by the elements in an equalization program, then the resulting changes in the residents’ 
consumption will change the size and composition of those factors. 
In this dissertation we consider the following scenarios regarding the possible 
choices of factors that could be used as measures of fiscal capacity or as shared tax bases: 
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1. Residential tax base that is directly related to the residents’ consumption of 
housing and could be used both as a measure of fiscal capacity or as a shared tax 
base. 
2. Actual revenue collections that are directly related to the residents’ consumption 
of publicly provided goods and could be used as a measure of fiscal capacity in 
incentive incompatible equalization programs. 
3. Commercial and industrial tax bases that relate to the residents’ consumption of 
environmental quality that is affected by positive or negative externalities 
produced by the presence of these businesses. 
Theoretical analysis of these scenarios is important for our empirical work as we 
consider unintended consequences of Russia’s regional equalization programs and of the 
Twin Cities Fiscal Disparities program in Minnesota. In Russia’s regions equalization 
grants are distributed among municipalities based on the size of their actual revenue 
collections, which makes the second scenario relevant to that case. The Twin Cities 
Fiscal Disparities program taxes commercial and industrial tax bases in municipalities 
and then redistributes the proceeds in the inverse proportion of their per capita residential 
and nonresidential property values, which makes the first and third scenarios relevant to 
that case.6
By definition, an equalization program redistributes resources from jurisdictions 
that are better off to jurisdictions that are worse off according to some parameters. This 
redistribution could be done in many different ways, but in this dissertation we limit our 
                                                 
6 In the empirical part of this dissertation when considering the Twin Cities Fiscal disparities 
program we focus on its effect on commercial and industrial property, leaving the analysis of its effect on 
other types of real property for future research. 
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analysis to two stylized equalization mechanisms: 1) a gap-filling program that collects a 
head tax from the residents of all jurisdictions and then distributes the proceeds to fill the 
gap between the area-wide standard of per capita expenditure needs and per capita fiscal 
capacity of each jurisdiction; 2) a tax base sharing program that taxes a particular tax 
base at a uniform area-wide tax rate and then distributes the proceeds as a uniform per 
capita grant among all jurisdictions in the area. 
An equalization program will usually combine the elements of both of these 
equalization mechanisms, but treating them separately allows us to highlight the 
substitution effects produced by the expenditure components of equalization programs 
(i.e., by formulas that assign equalization grants to jurisdictions) and by their revenue 
components (i.e., by taxes that contribute to equalization by taking more from 
jurisdictions with larger tax bases and less from jurisdictions with smaller tax bases.)  
Even though these two types of the equalization programs have been treated 
separately in the literature, there is a close resemblance of the equalization effect that 
they produce and they could be considered as mirror images of each other: the tax base 
sharing program takes more from better off jurisdictions and keeps the distributional part 
neutral, while the gap-filling program keeps the revenue side neutral, but gives more to 
poorer jurisdictions and less to richer ones when distributing the money. The following 
analysis shows that these two programs tend to produce similar substitution effects on the 
goods that are related to factors that are used either as measures of fiscal capacity or as 
shared tax bases. 
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The gap-filling equalization program collects the head tax H from each resident in 
all jurisdictions and redistributes the proceeds in the form of a per capita transfer 
according to the gap-filling formula: 
 )( ii CNbTr −=                                                                (3.1) 
where N–the area-wide standard of per capita expenditure needs for equalized budgets, 
set by the equalizing government; 
iC –per capita fiscal capacity of jurisdiction i that shows its ability to raise budget 
revenues in per capita terms. As explained above, we  will consider three scenarios of 
measuring fiscal capacity in per capita terms: by residential tax base, by actual revenue 
collections, and by commercial and industrial tax base; 
b–degree of equalization ( 10 ≤≤ b .)  
Given N and  the equalizing government can choose either H or b. If it chooses 
H–deciding how much revenues it is willing to collect from the residents of the area to 
spend on equalization–then the degree of equalization b is determined according to the 
following formula: 
iC
 
∑
∑
−
⋅
= n
i
ii
n
i
i
CNpop
Hpop
b
)(
)(
,                                                     (3.2) 
where –population of jurisdiction i;  ipop
 n–is a number of jurisdictions in the equalized area; 
∑n
i
ipop –population of the area included in the equalization program. 
 16
If the government sets the head tax H high enough, it could achieve a complete 
equalization by filling the gap between the area-wide standard of per capita expenditure 
needs N and per capita fiscal capacity  for each jurisdiction. iC
The equalizing government might choose the degree of equalization b instead, and 
then determine the size of the head tax that is necessary to provide a desired degree of 
equalization: 
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(3.3) 
The tax base sharing equalization program taxes the bases in each jurisdiction in 
the area at a uniform tax rate t and then redistributes the proceeds as a per capita grant h 
among residents of the area. In per capita terms the amount contributed by jurisdiction i 
to the program is: 
  ii tBT =                                                                            (3.4) 
where Bi–per capita tax base, 
t–the area-wide tax rate imposed on the tax base according to the program. 
The size of per capita grant h is determined by the amount of the tax collections 
divided by the size of total population in the area: 
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In per capita terms each jurisdiction contributes the amount of in taxes and 
receives the amount of  in grants. 
ii tBT =
h
In this case the equalizing government can either choose the tax rate t and then the 
size of per capita transfer h will be determined according to the formula above, or choose 
the size of per capita transfer h and then determine the required tax rate t: 
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1                                                                   (3.6) 
We show how these two equalization programs change budget constraint faced by 
the representative individual in the equalized jurisdiction and produce the substitution 
effects that tend to encourage the representative individual to reduce her consumption of 
the goods that are related to the factors that are used as either as the measure of fiscal 
capacity in the gap-filling equalization program or as a shared tax base in the tax base 
sharing program. 
There are four major simplifying assumptions used in the theoretical model: 
1. The model is static, which means that all adjustments take place immediately 
(or in other words, we allow in the analysis for an extended period of time so that all 
processes have enough time to come to equilibrium.) 
2. We assume that the population of the jurisdictions is homogeneous, which 
allows us to consider the representative individual and analyze her behavior in order to 
predict how the whole jurisdiction would react. 
3. The population is not mobile, so we should not worry about residents of the 
jurisdictions moving from one jurisdiction to another as well as outside of the equalized 
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area when an equalization program is introduced. This assumption also allows us to leave 
outside of the model the capitalization effect resulting from the changes in the effective 
prices of goods that are related to factors used as measures of fiscal capacity or as shared 
tax bases. 
4. Also for simplicity, the model does not distinguish between private and public 
goods because in the totally homogeneous communities taxes work like user fees. In such 
a situation the representative individual gets from government what she pays for, and in 
this sense the way she chooses the desired amount of public good is similar to the way 
she chooses the desired amount of private good. 
Using the Residential Tax Base as a Measure of Fiscal Capacity in the Gap-Filling 
Equalization Program or as a Shared Tax Base in the Tax Base Sharing Program 
 
First, we consider a scenario in which the residential tax base is used as a measure 
of fiscal capacity in the gap-filling equalization program or as a shared tax base in the tax 
base sharing program. 
As explained above, we assume that the population of each jurisdiction is 
homogeneous and all residents of the jurisdiction follow the representative individual in 
her choices. Suppose that the representative individual consumes housing X and all other 
goods (money) Y. Given that she has income I, her choice of the amount of housing and 
all other goods will be determined as a solution of the following utility maximization 
problem: 
  
I
                                                         (3.7) 
The solution of this problem is determined by the standard first order conditions. 
YXpts
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Using the Residential Tax Base as a Measure of Fiscal Capacity in the Gap-Filling 
Equalization Program 
 
Now, suppose that the gap-filling equalization formula described above is 
introduced. In formula (3.1) that determines the size of the equalization grant, fiscal 
capacity C is measured by the residential property values multiplied by the standard tax 
rate: 
 XtpC x=                                                                    (3.8) 
Accordingly, the transfer formula takes the following form: 
 )( XtpNbTr x−=                                                       (3.9) 
The representative individual also has to pay the head tax H. After adding the 
amount of per capita transfer determined by formula to the budget constraint, subtracting 
the amount of the head tax from it and rearranging the terms, we receive the new budget 
constraint that the representative individual is facing after the equalization program is 
introduced: 
  HbNIYXbtpx −+=++ )1( .                                                   (3.10) 
The first thing to notice here is that the change in the budget constraint resulting 
from the introduction of the gap-filling equalization program changes the effective price 
of the good consumed by the representative individual: the price of housing as the 
representative individual perceives it increases from  to xp )1( btpx + . Intuitively, the 
presense of the gap-filling equalization program increases the opportunity cost of one unit 
of housing as in this case the representative individual should take into account not only 
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the price she must pay to get one more unit of housing, but also the decrease in the 
amount of equalization transfers that goes down as the size of housing goes up. 
As housing becomes more expensive, the substitution effect takes place that 
moves the representative individual’s consumption away from housing–this is the major 
point of our model.  
Another effect of the program on the budget constraint is that the representative 
individual’s income changes by the amount of HbN − . This change in income also 
affects consumption of housing: because housing is a normal good, an increase in income 
will increase and a decrease in income will reduce  its consumption. The income effect 
resulting from redistribution of resources among jurisdictions can either encourage or 
discourage residents of the jurisdictions from consumption of housing, reinforcing or 
offsetting the substitution effect. 
We can specify the conditions under which the ultimate effect will be positive or 
negative referring to the compensated law of demand. The compensated law of demand 
tells us that if an increase in the price from  to xp )1( btpx +  is compensated by the 
amount of  that makes the initial consumption just affordable at a new price, then 
the consumption of X should unambiguously decrease. Because housing X is a normal 
good, we know that the consumption of X should unambiguously decrease if the 
compensation is smaller than , but if the compensation is larger than then 
we can not say with certainty how the representative individual will change her 
consumption of X as the income effect may or may not overpower the price effect. 
Xbtpx
Xbtpx Xbtpx
To find out the effect of the equalization program on consumption of housing X 
by the representative individual, we can compare the amount of income that is necessary 
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to exactly compensate the representative individual for the change in the price  
with the income effect of the program that the representative individual is facing. 
Accordingly, assuming that housing is a normal good, we can claim that if 
, then the change in the representative individual’s income is not enough 
to compensate her for the price increase, and her consumption of housing X will 
unambiguously decrease. If 
Xbtpx
XbtpHbN x≤−
XbtpHbN x>− , then we can not say with certainty whether 
consumption of X will go up or down because the income effect might overpower the 
price effect. 
Note that the above conditions define net donors and net recipients of the 
program: we can rearrange XbtpHbN x≤−  into HXtpNb x ≤− )( , which defines the 
effect of the program on the representative individual residing in the net donor 
jurisdiction, and into XbtpHbN x>− HXbtpNb x >− )( , which defines the effect of the 
program on the representative individual residing in the net recipient jurisdiction. 
According to the argument presented above, the representative individuals in the net 
donor jurisdictions should unambiguously decrease their consumption of housing, and the 
representative individuals in the net recipient jurisdictions could either decrease or 
increase their consumption of housing depending on whether the income effect of the 
program overpowers its price effect. 
Using the Residential Tax Base as a Shared Tax Base in a Tax Base Sharing Program 
Now, suppose that instead of the gap-filling equalization program a tax base 
sharing program is introduced. The tax base sharing program taxes residential property 
values in the jurisdiction at an area-wide tax rate t and then redistributes the proceeds of 
 22
taxation among its residents as per capita grant h. It means that in per capita terms each 
jurisdiction contributes the amount of  to the program and receives the amount of h. ix Xtp
The budget constraint that the representative individual is facing now takes the 
following form: 
 hIYXtpx +=++ )1(                                               (3.11) 
Similar to the case of a gap-filling equalization program, the major point here is 
that the tax base sharing program increases the effective price of housing as the 
representative individual perceives it: the price goes up from  to  - this is a 
standard result in the analysis of the effect of taxation. Intuitively, the presence of the tax 
base sharing program increases the opportunity cost of one unit of housing as the 
representative individual should take into account not only the price she must pay to get 
one more unit of housing, but also an increase in her tax payments as these go up as the 
size of housing goes up. 
xp )1( tpx +
Accordingly, this increase in price results in a substitution effect that encourages 
the representative individual to decrease consumption of housing. 
Also, similar to the case of a gap-filling equalization program, there is a change in 
the representative individual’s income as she receives the per capita transfer h. We can 
show that the ultimate effect of the program on consumption of housing by the residents 
depends on whether they live in net donor jurisdictions or in net recipient jurisdictions. 
The representative individual residing in a net donor jurisdiction will unambiguously 
decrease her consumption of housing X, while the representative individual residing in a 
net recipient jurisdiction the effect is uncertain as the income effect could overcome the 
income effect. 
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Using the Size of Actual Revenue Collections as a Measure of Fiscal Capacity  
in the Gap-Filling Equalization Program 
 
To show the effect of equalization on the size of revenue collections when these 
are used as a measure of jurisdictions’ fiscal capacity, we just need to notice that budget 
revenues are spent for publicly provided goods: 
 GpR G=                                                             (3.12) 
where R–actual revenue collections to the jurisdiction’s budget, 
G–the amount of publicly provided goods, 
–prices of the publicly provided goods. Gp
This equality between the revenue collections and the expenditures  holds as long 
as there is no substantial borrowing for a long period of time, which is a reasonable 
assumption in many cases. Assuming that the prices of publicly provided goods do not 
change, there is a direct proportion between the amount of publicly provided goods G, 
expenditures for these goods , and, most importantly for our analysis, actual revenue 
collections R.  
GpG
Accordingly, if we can analyze how equalization affects the representative 
individual’s consumption of publicly provided goods G, then we can argue that the 
changes in the consumption of these goods will transfer proportionally into the changes 
in actual revenue collections. 
Suppose that the representative individual spends her income I on publicly 
provided good G that is priced at  and all other goods (money) Y. We assume the 
benefit taxation scenario, which means that the representative individual is aware of the 
Gp
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true cost of publicly provided good G and which allows us to leave distortionary taxation 
outside of the model. 
The jurisdiction’s government follows the representative individual’s decision 
about the amount of publicly provided good that she chooses to consume as it collects the 
amount of revenue R that is sufficient to finance the provision of the chosen amount of 
the good. 
Without equalization the representative individual’s consumption is determined as 
a solution of the following utility maximization problem: 
                                                        (3.13) 
IYGpts
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The solution of this problem is determined by the standard first order conditions.  
Now, suppose that an equalization program is introduced that includes a per 
capita equalization grant distributed according to the gap-filling equalization formula 
(3.1) where fiscal capacity is measured by actual revenue collections R: 
 )( RNbTr −=                                                               (3.14) 
As we substitute  for R in the transfer formula, it takes the following form: GpG
 )( GpNbTr G−=                                                           (3.15) 
The representative individual also has to pay the head tax H, determined 
according to formula (3.3.) Adding these two additional elements to the budget constraint 
that the representative individual has been facing before the equalization program was 
introduced and rearranging the terms, we receive the following expression for the new 
budget constraint: 
 HbNIYGbpG −+=++ )1(                                         (3.16) 
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The change in the budget constraint resulting from the introduction of the gap-
filling equalization program is very similar to the scenario where fiscal capacity is 
measured with the size of residential property values: in this case we also can see that the 
price of the publicly provided good G as it is perceived by the representative individual 
increases from to , resulting in a substitution effect as the representative 
individual reduces consumption of the good that became more expensive. Intuitively, the 
presense of the gap-filling equalization program increases the opportunity cost of one unit 
of publicly provided good because in this case the representative individual should take 
into account not only the price she must pay to get one more unit of publicly provided 
good, but also the decrease in the amount of equalization transfers that goes down as the 
amount of revenue collections that are used to buy more publicly provided good goes up. 
Gp )1( bpG +
Note, that an increase in the price of publicly provided good is larger, larger is the 
degree of equalization b, which means that a larger degree of equalization produces a 
larger substitution effect. 
The income effect of the program is exactly the same as in the case above because 
the representative individual’s income also changes by the amount of . Following 
the same steps as above we can show that the income effect either reinforces or offsets 
the substitution effect depending on whether the representative individual resides in a net 
donor or in a net jurisdiction recipient. 
HbN −
As we pointed out above, because the amount of publicly provided good is 
proportional to the amount of actual revenue collections we can extend the results of our 
analysis in this case towards the effect of equalization on the amount of actual revenue 
collections. Thus, we conclude that using actual revenue collections as a measure of 
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fiscal capacity in the gap-filling equalization program results in a substitution effect that 
decreases the actual revenue collections, and the income effect can either reinforce or 
offset the substitution effect. 
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Using the Size of Commercial and Industrial Tax Bases as a Measure of Fiscal 
Capacity or as a Shared Tax Base 
 
In this section we consider the effect of equalization on the size of commercial 
and industrial tax bases when these are used as a measure of fiscal capacity or as a shared 
tax base. Commercial and industrial tax bases can include any tax bases that are related to 
economic activities in jurisdictions. For example, in the case of the Twin Cities Fiscal 
Disparities Program, which is considered in the empirical part of this dissertation 
commercial and industrial property values are used as both a shared tax base and as a 
measure of fiscal capacity. 
The model that we present here is based on the model of business locations 
developed by Fischel (1975), who argues that under certain conditions businesses that 
produce negative externalities have to compensate residents of the jurisdictions where 
they want to locate for the loss of environmental quality caused by these externalities. In 
such a case the market for business location develops where jurisdictions sell their 
environmental quality supplying locations for businesses and businesses purchase the 
environmental quality as they demand the locations. We extend this model considering a 
situation when positive externalities such as commuting and shopping conveniences 
produced by businesses exceed negative externalities resulting in a net positive effect. 
The key point of our analysis is that in both cases (i.e., whether businesses produce net 
positive or net negative externalities) an equalization program changes the effective price 
of environmental quality as perceived by the representative individual creating a 
substitution effect that tends to decrease the presence of businesses in the jurisdictions. 
The income effect resulting from redistribution of resources among jurisdictions can 
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either encourage or discourage residents of the jurisdictions from accepting the 
businesses inside their borders, reinforcing or offsetting the substitution effect. 
The Presence of Businesses Produces Net Negative Externalities 
Suppose that the representative individual’s income is I and she consumes 
environmental quality E and all other goods (money) Y. Similar to the previous scenarios, 
we assume that all residents in the jurisdiction are identical and follow the representative 
individual in her choices. The environmental quality is a pure public good, so each 
resident consumes the same amount of it. 
The amount of environmental quality that the representative individual consumes 
is determined by the following formula:  
 FEE α+= 0                                                                  (3.17) 
where E0 is the original endowment of environmental quality in the jurisdiction, 
and F is some measure of economic activity in the jurisdiction that affects the 
amount of environmental quality according to parameter α. 
For simplicity, we assume that F is the number of firms located in the jurisdiction 
and that it accurately measures the level of economic activity there, in which case 
parameter α shows how the number of firms affects the environmental quality in the 
jurisdiction. Assuming that businesses produce negative externalities (noise, pollution, 
traffic, etc), parameter α is negative and as the representative individual allows more 
firms in her jurisdiction the amount of environmental quality that she consumes goes 
down from the original level of E0. Of course, to be able to regulate the amount of 
environmental quality in their jurisdictions this way residents should have some 
instruments to keep the businesses out of their jurisdiction or let them in when they 
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choose to do so. We assume that for this purpose they can use zoning control or some 
other forms of regulation. 
As the presence of firms decreases the amount of environmental quality, 
consumed by the residents, the residents will only allow businesses to locate in their 
jurisdiction if the businesses compensate them for the loss of environmental quality by 
making some form of payment. We assume that the compensation is made by means of 
direct cash payments to the local government that divides the total amount equally among 
residents–this is what Fischel (1975) calls the direct payment system of compensation. 
The residents are assumed to be immobile, while businesses are mobile. Firms can 
shop around for business locations and the interaction of supply and demand results in a 
competitive equilibrium with the price per unit of the environmental quality . Ep
Under these assumptions the representative individual’s choice of the amount of 
environmental quality and all other goods will be determined as a solution of the 
following utility maximization problem: 
                                                             (3.18) 
The solution of this problem is determined by the standard first order conditions. The 
level of consumption of environmental quality determines the number of firms located in 
the jurisdiction according to formula (3.17). 
IYEpts
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Now, suppose that a gap-filling equalization program is introduced. This program 
includes per capita equalization grant distributed according to formula (3.1) where fiscal 
capacity is measured with the size of commercial and industrial tax bases in the 
jurisdiction multiplied by standard tax rate t. In the simplest case of that kind, fiscal 
capacity could be measured by the number of firms located in the jurisdiction multiplied 
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by the standard tax rate:7 
 )( tFNbTr −=                                                              (3.19) 
We can rearrange formula (3.17) to express the number of firms as a function of 
environmental quality: 
 α
0EEF −=                                                                   (3.20) 
After we substitute this expression in transfer formula (3.19), it takes the 
following form: 
 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−= αα
0EtEtNbTr                                                 (3.21) 
Similar to the cases above, we add the transfer and the head tax H to the budget 
constraint, rearrange the terms and receive the following expression for the new budget 
constraint: 
 HEbtbNIYEbtpE −++=+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ + 0αα                                   (3.22) 
As in the scenarious that we consider above (i.e. when fiscal capacities of 
jurisdictions are measured by the size of residential tax bases or by the size of revenue 
collections), in this case the key point is also that the change in the budget constraint 
resulting from the introduction of the gap-filling equalization program changes the 
effective price of the good consumed by the representative individual: the price of 
environmental quality as the representative individual perceives it changes from  to Ep
α
btpE + . 
                                                 
7 Of course, in this case t is not a conventional tax rate applied to a tax base, but a dollar amount 
charged from each firm. 
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Because we assumed that parameter α is negative (i.e., the presence of businesses 
reduces the amount of environmental quality in the jurisdiction), the price of 
environmental quality goes down. Intuitively, the gap-filling equalization program 
decreases the opportunity cost of environmental quality as in this case when the 
representative individual increases its consumption, the decrease in the payments 
resulting from the decrease in the number of businesses is partly compensated by the 
increase in the equalization transfers. 
As the price of environmental quality goes down, the representative individual is 
encouraged to consume more of it and, accordingly, to allow fewer businesses inside the 
borders of the jurisdiction. Thus, also as in the scenarios considered above, the 
substitution effect of the equalization program tends to reduce the size of the factor that is 
used as a measure of fiscal capacity. 
Also as above, the introduction of the equalization program changes the 
representative individual’s income, in this case by the amount of HEbtbN −+ 0α . The 
income effect either reinforces or offsets the substitution effect depending on whether the 
representative individual resides in a net recipient or in a net donor jurisdiction. 
Now, suppose that instead of a gap-filling equalization program a tax-base sharing 
program is introduced. This program taxes commercial and industrial tax bases according 
to formula (3.4) where B is measured by the number of firms F located in the jurisdiction 
in per capita terms: 
 ii tFT =                                                                      (3.23) 
The total amount collected in taxes is redistributed as per capita grant h. As we 
substitute  F using expression (3.20) in the tax formula, it takes the following form: 
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 )( 0EEtT −= α                                                              
(3.24) 
After subtracting the amount of the tax from the budget constraint, adding the 
amount of per capita grant h and rearranging the terms, we receive the new budget 
constraint faced by the representative individual: 
 hEtIYEtpE ++=+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ + 0αα                                      (3.25) 
In this case we can see familiar changes in the budget constraint as the price of 
environmental quality E as it is perceived by the representative individual decreases by 
the amount of α
t  (assuming that parameter α is negative) and the representative 
individual’s income changes by the amount of hEt +0α . (Note, that because parameter α 
is negative the change in income could be either positive or negative.) Accordingly, the 
reduction in the price encourages the representative individual to consume more of 
environmental quality, allowing fewer firms to locate in the jurisdiction, while the change 
in income might reinforce or offset the substitution effect.  
The Presence of Businesses Produces Net Positive Externalities 
To analyze the case when businesses produce net positive externalities we just 
need to notice that the sign of parameter α will be positive in this case and follow the 
same steps as above. As we can see from formula (3.17), when α is positive the amount 
of environmental quality increases as the number of businesses F goes up. Because the 
presence of businesses produces environmental quality consumed by residents, residents  
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are willing to pay businesses to attract them into their jurisdictions, and a market for 
business location develops where jurisdictions purchase net positive externalities 
produced by businesses. 
Because now parameter α is positive, the change in the price of environmental 
quality from  to Ep α
btpE +  resulting from the introduction of the program means that 
environmental quality becomes more expensive, which results in a substitution effect 
reducing its consumption. This result is an inverse of what we have received when 
considering the case of net negative externalities produced by the presence of businesses, 
but because the relationship between the amount of environmental quality and the 
number of firms in this case is proportional, the change in the price for environmental 
quality produced by the program results in a decrease of the number of firms located in 
the jurisdiction as well. Also as above, the income effect of the program can either 
reinforce or offset the substitution effect. 
In the case of tax base sharing program the change in the sign of parameter α 
produces a similar effect, leaving the major results of our analysis unchanged. As in the 
case when the presence of businesses produces negative externalities, an introduction of 
the tax base sharing program produces a substitution effect that decreases the number of 
firms located in the jurisdiction, while the income effect of the program might either 
reinforce or offset the substitution effect. 
Table 1 summarizes the scenarios considered in the theoretical section of this 
work and demonstrates the substitution and the income effects that gap-filling and tax 
base sharing equalization program might produce on the factors that are used as a 
measure of fiscal capacity or as a shared tax base. 
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Table 1 
The Substitution and the Income Effects of Gap-Filling and Tax Base Sharing 
Equalization Programs on the Factors that are Used as a Measure Fiscal Capacity or as a 
Shared Tax Base 
 
Factor Good Substitution 
effect on the 
good 
Substitution 
effect on the 
factor 
Income 
effect on the 
factor for 
recipient 
jurisdictions 
Income 
effect on the 
factor for 
donor 
jurisdictions 
Residential 
tax base 
Housing Negative Negative Negative Positive 
Actual 
revenue 
collections 
Publicly 
provided 
good 
Negative Negative Negative Positive 
C/I tax base 
with 
negative 
externalities 
Environ-
mental 
quality 
Positive Negative Positive Negative 
C/I tax base 
with 
positive 
externalities 
Environ-
mental 
quality 
Negative Negative Negative Positive 
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CHAPTER 4 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
To test empirically the hypothesis that equalization programs produce 
disincentives that negatively affect the size of the factors used to measure fiscal capacity 
or taxed with the purpose of further redistribution of resources, we study two cases. The 
first is a case study of the effect of equalization practices in Russia’s regions towards 
their constituent municipalities. As the regions distribute transfers among municipalities 
based on the size of their actual revenue collections, the expected effect of equalization is 
a reduction in revenue collections in those regions where the degree of equalization is 
higher. The second case investigates the effect on the tax-base of the tax sharing program 
in the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area, Minnesota. This program taxes commercial and 
industrial properties in seven central counties of the metro area at a uniform tax rate and 
redistributes the proceeds among municipalities in direct proportion to the size of their 
population and in inverse proportion to the size of their per capita real property values. 
The expected disincentive effects that we empirically test should negatively affect the 
size of commercial and industrial property in the metropolitan area. 
The Case of Russia 
The equalization programs implemented by the regional governments in the 
Russian Federation vis-à-vis their local governments were (and in many cases they 
continue to be so) based on the revenues actually collected by the jurisdictions the year 
prior to the implementation of the equalization scheme (Martinez-Vazquez and Boex 
2001). The theoretical model developed in the previous section shows that the 
equalization programs based on actual revenue collections produce a substitution effect 
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that decreases consumption of publicly provided goods and, consequently, reduce the size 
of budget revenue collections in the equalized jurisdictions. Accordingly, in this section 
we test the proposition that regional equalization programs negatively affected the size of 
revenue collections in the municipalities and that these effects have been more 
pronounced in those regions where the equalization schemes have been more aggressive 
(i.e., where the degree of equalization has been higher). 
Estimating the Degree of Equalization Faced by Municipalities in Russia’s Regions 
The first step in our analysis is to estimate the degree of equalization that 
municipalities were facing in different regions as represented by parameter b in equation 
(3.14) in the previous section. As explained in the theoretical section, the larger the 
degree of equalization b, the larger the change in the price of the publicly provided good 
as the representative individual perceives it, and, accordingly, the larger the expected 
substitution effect produced by the equalization program that reduces consumption of the 
publicly provided good and, consequently, the size of budget revenue collections. 
As the mechanisms that guide redistribution of resources among municipalities in 
Russia’s regions are very complicated and lack transparency,8 this task could not be done 
by direct analysis of those mechanisms to derive the degree of equalization in the regions. 
One can not look at the equalizing effect of regional grants in local budgets in per capita 
terms either because most regions measure municipalities’ expenditure needs not by the 
size of their population, but by the size of their local infrastructure, which most of the 
                                                 
8 See for example Bahl et al. (1999) for a description of mechanisms used to redistribute grants 
among municipalities in Leningrad oblast. 
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time is distributed quite unevenly among municipalities.9 Instead we use the fact that 
parameter b in (3.14) could be interpreted as defining the rate of revenue clawback 
resulting form the equalization mechanism in which the size of equalization transfer Tr is 
determined by (3.14):   
 dTr/dR= -b                                             (4.1) 
As this expression shows, for the purpose of our analysis we do not need the 
information about the way the per capita expenditure needs N are measured in equation 
(3.14). What matters is how the size of regional transfers changes in response to changes 
in the size of actual revenue collections to municipalities’ budgets. In reality, the system 
of shared taxes with variable sharing rates (which receive the name in Russia of 
“regulating rates”) makes measuring the offsetting effect of regional transfers to 
municipalities a complicated task. In the following two sections we develop a new 
approach to this problem building on previous works by Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya 
(2003) and Zhuravskaya (2000). 
Measuring Fiscal Incentives Faced by Municipalities in Russia 
Revenue clawback occurs when changes in regional transfers partially or fully 
offset changes in the municipalities’ own revenues. As explained above, the revenue 
clawback is an inevitable result of an equalization program that redistributes funds via 
equalization grants based on municipalities’ actual revenue collections.  This relationship 
                                                 
9 This practice in some cases could still result in an equalization of locally provided services in per 
capita terms, in particular, if we take into account a common practice when schools and hospitals that are 
financed by one municipality serve  residents of nearby localities, which makes them more of region-wide 
service providers rather than local entities. 
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allows us to estimate the degree of equalization by measuring the budget revenue 
collections clawback faced by the equalized jurisdictions. 
Since changes in regional transfers might have not only offsetting, but also 
matching effects vis-à-vis municipalities’ own revenues, we will use the more general 
term of “fiscal incentives.” When changes in regional transfers offset changes in 
municipalities’ own revenues, these fiscal incentives are negative (the clawback case), 
and  when changes in regional transfers match changes in municipalities own revenues 
these fiscal incentives are positive (the matching case). 
In the previous literature (Zhuravskaya 2000, Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya 2003), 
fiscal incentives are associated with the offsetting effect of changes in regional transfers 
in response to the changes in the municipalities’ own revenues. The problem is that in 
these two works the term “own revenues” is defined differently and neither of the authors 
presents a clear argument why own revenues should be defined in a particular way. 
Zhuravskaya (2000) defines own revenues as the revenues from sources assigned to local 
budgets by federal laws, while Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya (2003) also include in this 
category revenues from shared regional taxes. 
A natural question for us to ask is: what approach should we follow? To answer 
this question we analyze and compare these two approaches and then develop our own. 
There is a difference in the samples of municipalities that the authors analyze, 
which might justify the differences in their approaches. Zhuravskaya’s sample includes 
large cities from different regions of Russia with developed economies and relatively 
large tax bases. These municipalities retained relatively small shares of regional taxes and 
faced frequent changes in those shares from year to year. 
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In contrast, Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya’s sample includes poorer municipalities 
from one region (Rostovskaya oblast), which retained the entire regional shares of major 
shared taxes for the period of time for which the data are available. The difference in 
these two approaches could be explained by the stability of sharing rates–as 
municipalities in Zhuravskaya’s sample were facing frequent changes in the sharing rates, 
it might seem reasonable to consider the receipts from sharing taxes as an actively used 
tool of adjusting municipalities’ revenues. In contrast, in Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya’s 
sample the sharing rates are fixed at the maximum level and stay intact for three years, 
which makes it reasonable to consider the proceeds from shared taxes as “own revenues.” 
Zhuravskaya’s approach reflects more orthodoxy in fiscal decentralization theory 
and practice, where revenue sharing is considered generally a transfer. Moreover, 
Zhuravskaya’s approach is more sound from the point of view of the stability of sharing 
rates as the retention rates of municipalities’ federally assigned own revenues could not 
be varied among local budgets according to the federal law. 
In contrast, Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya’s approach is less conventional, and from 
the point of view of the stability of sharing rates it is less secure because potentially no 
municipality could be absolutely sure that the region would not change its sharing rates at 
some point. Another problem with their approach is that they could only apply it to 46 
out of 55 municipalities in Rostovskaya oblast because only those 46 municipalities were 
facing stable sharing rates during the period of observation. 
Why bother at all by including shared revenue sources in the category of own 
revenues and making some assumptions about stability of sharing rates? Why limit the 
sample of municipalities to make sure that their sharing rates are unlikely to change? 
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There should be some serious advantage of including sharing revenues in the category of 
own revenues when the sharing rates are stable, or, equivalently, some serious 
disadvantage of including them in the category of transfers. 
Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya do not elaborate on these questions–they just argue 
that because for those municipalities that were facing stable sharing rates only regional 
grants were used to offset changes in revenue collections it makes it relatively easy to 
separate own revenues from transfers by putting the proceeds from shared revenue 
sources in the category of own revenues. 
We provide further support to the intuition behind Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya’s 
approach by arguing that when a substantial portion of shared taxes is assigned to a local 
budget and the sharing rates do not change over a significant period of time, the revenues 
from these sources can be interpreted to become similar to the revenues from the 
federally assigned sources. Local governments can not change the tax rates for shared 
revenue sources, but they might be able to affect the size of the tax bases that most of the 
time are closely correlated with the tax bases for federally assigned own revenue sources, 
also local governments can influence tax administrators. From this angle when the 
sharing rates are stable it makes sense to put revenues from the shared sources in the 
same category as federally assigned own revenues. 
Even though formally the revenues from the shared taxes in this case remain to be 
transfers, we should recognize the fact that these transfers are assigned to local budgets in 
a specific way–in direct proportion to the size of their tax bases. Conceptually, these are 
much closer to the federally assigned own revenues than to the regional grants (or direct 
subsidies as Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya call them), and should be treated as the revenues 
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that are subject to offset, not as the revenues that are used as the instrument of offset by 
regions. 
This argument also provides us with an answer to another question–what is the 
disadvantage of including the proceeds from shared sources in the same category as 
grants when sharing rates are stable? Because we know that as long as the sharing rates 
stay unchanged only grants are used to offset changes in municipalities’ revenues, putting 
proceeds from shared sources and grants in the same category will obscure our purpose–
figuring out to what extend regions offset the changes in municipality’s revenues. Thus, 
for municipalities that are facing stable sharing rates Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya’s 
approach is more suitable than Zhuravskaya’s method. 
However, despite its advantage in terms of treating proceeds from shared sources 
when sharing rates are stable, Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya’s approach has some serious 
problems as well. 
Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya’s reliance on the stability of sharing rates raises a 
number of questions. First, to what extent should a municipality be sure that, on the 
margin, the changes in collections of these taxes would not lead to changes in the sharing 
rates to justify the treatment of municipalities’ shared revenues as their own revenues? 
Put differently, how large should the “cushion” of grants be to make sure that there is 
enough of them to be taken away by the region in response to an increase in the 
municipality’s collections before the cuts in the sharing rates become likely?  
There is little doubt that the municipalities that retained the entire regional shares 
of major shared taxes for a number of years and for which grants accounted for well over 
the half of their total revenues from Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya’s sample can be quite 
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sure that they could go a long way in raising their collections before the region will 
consider cutting the sharing rates. But what if the share of grants in the municipality’s 
total revenues is not over 50%, as in Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya’ sample,  but is about 
20% or 10%? Would local government feel secure about their sharing rates being stable 
at 20% and not secure at 10%? And if so, where is the line that separates the secure zone 
of the share of grants in municipalities’ total revenues from non-secure one? The fact is 
that conceptually it is impossible to draw such a line here, and potentially no municipality 
could be absolutely sure that the regional government will not cut its sharing rates if the 
municipality’s collections rise high enough.10
How should we treat the proceeds from the shared taxes for those municipalities 
that are facing changes in sharing rates? Should we immediately switch to Zhuravskaya’s 
approach, i.e., excluding all proceeds from shared revenue sources from the category of 
own revenues when we observe that a municipality experienced a change in its sharing 
rates however small that change was? What if a municipality retained the entire share of 
shared taxes for a number of years and then just  in one year the region took away say 5% 
of the revenues from the shared sources–should we treat the entire proceeds from the 
shared revenue sources as transfers for all period of observation in this case? 
The following example shows that when municipalities retain a large portion of 
revenues from shared revenue sources this kind of triggering approach might be a source 
                                                 
10 In fact, even having a substantial share of grants in a municipality’s revenues does not guarantee 
that the sharing rates will not be cut, as some regions (e.g., Tyumenskaya  oblast in late 1990s-early 2000s) 
preferred to provide its municipalities with grants even though it was possible to increase their sharing rates 
instead. Regional administration explained this policy by the fact that the municipalities’ collections from 
the tax bases were very unstable and unpredictable, and the regional grants secured more stability in local 
budget revenues. 
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of inconsistency as in this case there would be apparent lack of continuity in treating 
municipalities with slightly different revenue structure. 
Consider for example Figure 4.1, which shows the composition of per capita 
revenues for two municipalities. Both municipalities are very similar in terms of per 
capita revenues, but municipality A is a little bit poorer while municipality B is a little bit 
richer: when both municipalities retain the entire share of shared taxes municipality A 
collects 60 thousand rubles and municipality B collects 64 thousand rubles in revenues 
per capita. Suppose that the regional government sets the revenue target at 62 thousand 
rubles per capita, and, accordingly provides municipality A with 2 thousand rubles per 
capita in transfers, and cuts the sharing rates for municipality B in such a way that both 
municipalities exactly meet the revenue target of 62 thousand rubles per capita. 
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Figure 4.1: An Illustration of Triggering Approach When Separating Own and Shared 
Revenues for Two Municipalities with Similar Revenue Structure 
 
 
Suppose than that per capita revenues of municipality A fluctuate just a little bit 
below the revenue target, so it keeps receiving regional transfers to close the gap, while 
per capita revenue of municipality B (if it retained the entire share of the shared taxes) 
fluctuate a little bit above the revenue target, so it keeps maintaining smaller than a 100% 
share in shared taxes. In such a case we will observe that municipality A is facing “stable 
sharing rates” while municipality B is not, and we will have to treat the shared revenues 
received by municipality A as its own revenues, and the shared revenues received by 
municipality B as regional transfers. Switching such a big chunk of revenues from one 
category to another based on such a small difference in sharing rates demonstrates the 
lack of continuity that presents a serious problem. 
This analysis shows that not only the application of Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya’s 
is limited to analysis of fiscal incentives faced by poor municipalities, but it is also quite 
problematic to combine Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya’s approach with Zhuravskaya’s 
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method to have a universal method of measuring fiscal incentives for all municipalities in 
Russia without exceptions. 
Thus, given the two approaches used in the existing literature to measure fiscal 
incentives faced by municipalities that receive revenues from shared sources, we have 
two options: first, is to limit our analysis to municipalities that satisfy Alexeev and 
Kurlyandskaya’s criteria of stable sharing rates, and, second, is to use Zhuravskaya’s 
approach applying it universally to all municipalities for which the data are available. 
As explained above, Zhuravskaya’s approach is not suitable to analyze fiscal 
incentives of municipalities that were facing stable sharing rates for a long period of time. 
Limiting our sample of municipalities to those that satisfy Alexeev and 
Kurlyandskaya’s criteria of stable sharing rates means considering only poor 
municipalities that not only had the entire sharing rates of regional shared taxes assigned 
to their budgets for a long period of time, but also had a substantial share of grants in 
their revenues  to make sure that they would not face changes in sharing rates in case 
their revenues increase. Even though the number of such municipalities in Russia is 
substantial, especially in the poorer regions (e.g., in1996-98 in Rostov oblast, considered 
by Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya, more than 80% of municipalities satisfied these criteria), 
their tax bases comprise rather small portion of the regions’ total as most of them are 
represented by rural rayons whose agricultural economies do not generate enough 
revenues to cover local governments’ expenditure needs. 
By any means, applying a method that limits our analysis to a particular sample of 
municipalities is not a desirable thing to do. Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya admit that their 
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results can not be meaningfully compared with Zhuravskaya’s results because the 
characteristics of municipalities included in their analysis are very different. 
As we are facing two possible approaches to measure fiscal incentives faced by 
municipalities, neither of which is free from problems, we develop our own, more general 
approach. This approach incorporates Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya’s as their approach is 
a special case of our method, while Zhuravskaya’s approach could be considered as an 
approximation of our method when municipalities’ sharing rates are actively used by the 
regional government to offset changes in local revenues. 
The core of our approach is the notion that the changes in proceeds from shared 
revenue sources could be separated into two components: one component resulting from 
changes in the size of tax bases and fiscal discipline in the municipality, and another 
component resulting from the changes in sharing rates. We attribute the first component 
to the same category as changes in municipalities’ federally assigned own revenues, 
considering it as the subject of offset by regional government, and attribute the second 
component to the same category as the changes in regional grants received by 
municipalities, considering it as the instrument of offset used by regional government. 
For example, if the sharing rate for some revenue source had been reduced from 
the previous year, the revenues from this source would go down, other things being 
equal, but we do not want to count this decrease as the one that the regional government 
might offset with changes in grants because that decrease was the result of its own 
decision. Quite to the contrary, we want to put the changes in shared revenues resulted 
from the changes in sharing rates together with the changes in monetary transfers and 
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separate them from the changes in shared revenues that result from the changes in the 
size of the tax bases and in fiscal discipline. 
More formally, if we define the revenues from shared tax j of municipality i in 
year t as 
 ,                                                                    (4.1) tij
t
ij
t
ij SCSR =
where C represents the collections of the tax that are split between local and 
regional budgets according to sharing rate S (the share received by local budget of 
municipality i), then the change in these revenues could be separated in two components:  
 .                 (4.3) )()( 1111 −−−− −+−=− tijtijtijtijtijtijtijtij SSCCCSSRSR
or in a shorter notation: 
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The first component, , represents the change in municipalities’ revenues 
from shared taxes resulting from the change in the size of collections, given that the 
sharing rate is fixed. These changes in the revenues could be affected by local 
governments, assuming that they have tools to influence the size of local tax bases and 
tax administration effectiveness in their municipalities. 
t
ij
t
ij CS ∆−1
The second component, , represents the change in municipalities’ revenues 
from the shared tax resulting from the change in the sharing rate, given that the amount of 
collections from this revenue source does not change. The sharing rate is changed by the 
region and can not be affected by local government, similar to the change in the size of 
grant from regional budget. 
t
ij
t
ij SC ∆
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We put the changes in the federally assigned revenues together with the first 
component and call these the changes in the “assigned revenues”: 
 The change in the assigned revenues from the previous year is:  
 ∑ ∆+∆=∆ −
j
t
ij
t
ij
t
i
t
ij CSFARAR
1 ,                                        (4.5) 
where denotes the changes in federally assigned own revenues of the 
municipality, and is defined above. The summation over j is made over the five 
major taxes that are commonly shared with local budgets in Russia (VAT, personal 
income tax, enterprise profit tax, enterprise asset tax, and excises). 
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We put the changes in regional transfers together with the second component and 
call these changes in “transfers”: 
The change in the transfers from the previous year is: 
 ∑ ∆+∆=∆
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i SCMTr                                                 (4.6) 
where denotes the changes in the amount of regional grants (monetary 
transfers), and is the change in revenues resulting from the change in the sharing 
rate for five shared revenue sources. 
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Similarities and Differences between Our Approach and the Ones Used by Zhuravskaya 
(2000) and by Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya (2003) 
 
We can compare this approach with the ones used by Zhuravskaya (2000) and 
Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya (2003)11 by looking at equations (4.5) and (4.6) and the 
equations below that describe assigned revenues and transfers according to these 
authors12: 
In Zhuravskaya, changes in own revenues are: 
 ,                                                               (4.7) ti
t
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and changes in transfers are: 
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In Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya, changes in own revenues (assuming that 
) are: 0=∆ tijS
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and changes in transfers are: 
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t
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Here, (in Shishkin) changes in own revenues are: 
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and changes in transfers are: 
 ∑ ∆+∆
j
t
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ij
t
i SCM                                                           (4.12) 
Table 2 and Figure 4.2 summarize the difference between these three approaches: 
 
 
                                                 
11 In their work Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya (2003) enhance their approach by using planned 
figures of municipalities’ revenues, but we represent the one where they use actual numbers as it makes it 
more comparable to our approach. 
12 The size of municipalities’ population and year dummies are omitted from the equations.  
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Table 2 
Summary of Three Approaches to Measure Fiscal Incentives Faced by Russia’s 
Municipalities 
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The first thing we can notice is that when applied to the sample of municipalities 
considered by Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya, our approach produces identical results as 
their approach. The formulas used to calculate changes in assigned revenues are the same 
in both cases, and formulas used to calculated changes in transfers differ by the element 
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∑ ∆
j
t
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t
ij SC , which is equal to zero when sharing rates are stable. Instead of separating this 
element from total changes in the proceeds from shared taxes as we do in our approach, 
Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya just exclude from their sample those municipalities that were 
facing changes in sharing rates, basically filtering this element away together with these 
municipalities. Thus, our approach is more general and it includes Alexeev and 
Kurlyandskaya’s as a particular case. 
The comparison also shows that changes in the assigned revenues defined 
according to our approach differ from the changes defined by Zhuravskaya by component 
  - the changes in collections from shared revenues, given that sharing rates are 
fixed. Thus, these two formulas will produce identical results when municipality i retains 
none of shared taxes or when there is not changes in revenue collections, which makes 
this element equal to zero in our formula. Otherwise as long as the changes in the 
collections of federally assigned revenues and sharing taxes have the same sign,
∑ ∆
j
t
ij
t
ij CS
13 the 
changes in the assigned revenues defined according to our method will always exceed the 
changes defined according to Zhuravskaya (in absolute values.) The difference would be 
the larger the larger is the sharing rate retained by a municipality. 
The changes in transfers defined according to our approach differ from the 
changes defined by Zhuravskaya by the component ∑ ∆−
j
t
ij
t
ij CS
1 as well. Assuming that 
the regions tend to offset changes in federally assigned revenues and in revenues from 
shared taxes with the changes in the sharing rates and in the amount of monetary 
                                                 
13 This should be the case most of the time as both federally assigned revenues and shared taxes 
are linked to the same economic base. 
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transfers, the total change in transfers according to our approach should also be larger 
than the one defined according to Zhuravskaya (in absolute values.)14
The Data Sources Used to Estimate the Fiscal Incentive Coefficients 
To calculate the changes in the assigned revenues according to formula (4.5), and 
the changes in the transfers according to formula (4.6) that are used to estimate fiscal 
incentives that municipalities were facing in different regions, we need the following 
data: 
1) federally assigned own revenues, 
2) collections of shared revenues,  
3) sharing rates, 
4) monetary transfers from regional budgets to localities.  
Federally assigned own revenues and monetary transfers data are available from 
the Center for Fiscal Policy’s database, which contains individual municipalities’ budget 
data for a number of regions from 1995 to 2001. Sharing rates are retrieved from the 
regional budget laws, available on the Internet.15
To adjust the data for different years, we follow Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya’s 
suggestion to adjust the data by the ratio of the region sum of municipal total revenues for 
the relevant years instead of using the price index. They argue that using this kind of 
adjustment instead of the price index might make more sense because there is a number 
of factors besides the change in the general price level in the region that affect regional 
                                                 
14 The fact that both components are larger in my case should not be confusing if we keep in mind 
that we are talking about absolute values here. As we expect the offsetting effect from one component on 
another, the sum of the changes in nominal values should be the same whether we use Zhuravskaya’s 
approach or mine. 
15 Accessed 1 June 2007, available from www.budgetrf.ru  
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budgets and their ability to provide municipalities with transfers in particular. According 
to Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya, in this case revenues of municipality i in year t would be 
multiplied by the ratio of the sum of municipal revenues in the region in year t to that of 
t-1: 
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γ                                                                    (4.13) 
where –total revenues (including assigned revenues and monetary grants from 
regional budget) of municipality i at year t, 
t
iR
1−t
iR –total revenues of municipality i at year t-1, 
 n–the number of municipalities in the region, 
Thus, adjusted revenues for municipality i from revenue source j in year t would 
be calculated as: 
                                                                (4.14) tij
t
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I use a similar technique, but instead of multiplying revenues of municipality i in 
year t by the ratio of the sum of municipal revenues in the region in year t to that of t-1 I 
multiply it by the ratio of the sum of municipal revenues in the region in year t to that of 
year T, where T indicates the first year for which the data are available for this particular 
region: 
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where –total revenues of municipality i at year T, TiR
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Accordingly, adjusted revenues for municipality i from revenue source j in year t 
are calculated as: 
                                                                (4.16) tij
t
ij RR ⋅= δˆ
It makes the sum of adjusted total revenues of all municipalities in a region in 
each year equal to their revenues in the base year. This adjustment eliminates all shifts in 
municipalities’ total revenues that could have resulted from different factors that affected 
all municipalities as a whole (e.g., reassignment of expenditure responsibilities) and only 
leaves year to year variations in municipalities’ revenues relative to each other. 
One of the greatest challenges for our empirical analysis is the fact that the data 
for revenue collections from the territory of each municipality are not available. Thus, we 
need to find some proxy to estimate these collections. For this purpose I use the data on 
revenues received by local budgets and their retention rates for shared revenue sources. 
For federally assigned own revenue sources the relationship between the amount of 
collections and the amount of revenues is straightforward as either all collections or a 
certain proportion of the collections from those revenue sources that is uniformly 
determined for all municipalities in Russia by federal law are supposed to end up in the 
local budgets as their revenues. 
For shared revenue sources the relationship between the amount of collections 
and the amount of revenues received by local budgets is also straightforward as long as 
the local budget retains 100% of the collections.16 When the sharing rate is less than 
100%, we should realize that the revenues received by the local budget from this revenue 
source represent only a fraction of total collections (i.e., the collections that are split 
                                                 
16 As in Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya’s sample of municipalities. 
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between local and regional budgets), and this fraction is determined by the size of the 
sharing rate: 
                                                                (4.17) tij
t
ij
t
ij CSR =
When we know the share of collections that municipality i was supposed to retain 
for revenue source j in year t, , and the size of revenues from this source, , we can 
estimate the  size of collections by rearranging this formula and presenting it in the 
following form: 
t
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 ,                                                            (4.18) 
The relationship between the size of collections and the sharing rate is inverse because 
the smaller municipality’s sharing rate, the larger is the portion of collections retained by 
regional budget. Thus, given the amount of revenues received by local budget, the 
smaller its sharing rate, the large is the amount of revenues received by the regional 
budget from this revenue source from the territory of the municipality, and, accordingly, 
the larger the total collections from this revenue source. 
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Accordingly, the changes in municipalities’ revenues from shared taxes resulting 
from the change in the size of collections, given that the sharing rate is fixed, can be 
calculated as 
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The changes in municipalities’ revenues from the shared tax resulting from the 
change in the sharing rate, given that the amount of collections from this revenue source 
does not change can be calculated as: 
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As we can see from formula (4.18), we can not estimate the amount of collections 
from a shared revenue source when the sharing rate  is zero: as the local budget 
receives nothing of total collections from this revenue source we can not use its revenues 
as an indicator of how much revenues from this source have been collected on its 
territory. All revenues from this revenue source go into the regional budget, and as we do 
not have the information on how much revenues have been collected in the regional 
budget from each municipality, we can not estimate the amount of revenue collections in 
this case. 
t
ijS
For our purposes, it is not a problem when a sharing rate in the previous year  
is equal to zero because in this case the left side of equation (4.19) is equal to zero. The 
following rearrangement of equation (4.19) clarifies this observation: 
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All elements in this formula both in the left side and in the right side are equal to 
zero (the amount of revenues  is naturally equal to zero when the sharing rate is set to 
zero). 
1−t
ijR
Intuitively, when the sharing rate in the previous year is zero, changes in the 
amount of collections do not affect the changes in the amount of municipality’s revenues 
given that the sharing rate is unchanged. 
When sharing rates both in the current and in the previous year are set to zero, this 
is not a problem either because in such a case we know that the municipality received 
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none of revenues from this shared source and its revenues were not affected neither by 
changes in its collections as calculated by formula (4.19) nor by changes in its sharing 
rates as calculated by formula (4.20). In other words, we just set both elements calculated 
by formulas (4.19) and (4.20) to zero. 
When the sharing rate in the current year, , is set to zero, and the sharing rate 
in the previous year,  is not, we can not receive meaningful results using formulas 
(4.20) and (4.21) as  is present in the denominators in both formulas. 
t
ijS
1−t
ijS
t
ijS
There are very few instances of this kind, and in such a case we can assume that 
the sharing rate in the previous year was also zero, reducing this case to the previous 
one.17
Estimating Municipalities’ Fiscal Incentives 
The Center for Fiscal Policy’s budget database provides the data on individual 
municipalities’ revenues from 1995 to 2001 for a number of regions with some gaps. 
There are also some gaps in the budget laws of the regions (some laws are not available 
and some budget laws miss appendixes with sharing rates). The analysis of the data has 
shown that the data on municipalities’ revenues for 1995 and 1996 are not reliable, and 
because of it I limit the use of the data for years 1997-2001. 
The available data allow us to get 123 estimates of municipalities’ fiscal 
incentives in 47 regions over a period of 4 years. The general estimation form is given by 
  ,                                    (4.22) tii
t
i
t
i ePopbARkaTr +⋅+∆⋅+=∆
                                                 
17 To treat this case more accurately we can extrapolate the amount of collections in the pervious 
year to the current year, assuming that they grew at the same rate as the federally assigned own revenues of 
the municipality. 
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These estimates are presented in Appendix I. 
The major conclusion that we can make looking at this table is that most of the 
time (93 out of 123 estimates) municipalities were facing negative fiscal incentives (i.e., 
clawbacks). Another observation is that there is a limited number of regions where 
municipalities were facing strictly negative or strictly positive fiscal incentives for all 
years for which the data are available: for municipalities in 18 regions the estimates of 
fiscal incentives are strictly negative and for municipalities in 2 regions the estimates are 
strictly positive. For municipalities in the other 27 regions the estimates of fiscal 
incentives are zigzagging from positive to negative and back. 
The presence of gaps in the panel does not allow us consistently to compare fiscal 
incentives that municipalities were facing in different regions. For example, of those 18 
regions where municipalities were facing negative fiscal incentives in each year for 
which the data are available, only 7 have four or three years of observations. All others 
have two years or even only one year, as for example, Arkhangelskaya oblast. We can 
only guess which sign the estimates of fiscal incentives would have in the years for which 
the data are not available. 
Those regions with strictly negative estimates of fiscal incentives and at least 
three years of observations are Buryatia republic, Amurskaya oblast, Rostovskaya oblast 
(used by Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya in their analysis), and Sakhalinskaya oblast (four 
years of observations), Kurskaya oblast, Leningradskaya oblast, and Sverdlovlskaya 
oblast (three years of observations). 
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There are two regions that have positive fiscal incentives coefficients for all years 
for which the data are available: Krasnoyarskiy krai (2000 and 2001) and Ivanovskaya 
oblast (1998 and 1999.) 
The range of the fiscal incentive coefficients stays in a reasonable range: for the 
time period from 1998 to 2001 it varies from 1.25 for Kurganskaya oblast in 1999 to -
1.318 for Tomskaya oblast in 2001. 
The Effect of Municipalities’ Fiscal Incentives on Tax Effort in Regions 
In the theory section of this work we show that equalization programs based on 
actual revenue collections might create a substitution effect that discourage municipalities 
from consuming publicly provided goods, and, accordingly, collect smaller amounts of 
their own revenues, other things being equal, when the degree of equalization is higher. 
But for the amount of actual revenue collections to change when the degree of 
equalization increases it is not enough for municipalities to be facing certain 
disincentives–they also need to be able to change the amount of revenue collections 
according to these disincentives.  
Thus, a critical question that we should ask before putting forward a hypothesis 
that will be tested empirically is whether Russia’s local governments have any 
instruments that allow them to affect the amount of budget revenues collected on the 
territories of their jurisdictions if fiscal incentives or disincentives induce them to do so. 
We argue that, despite the fact that all taxes in Russia are collected by the federal 
Ministry and neither regional nor local governments have any formal power that allows 
                                                 
18 When the estimate of fiscal incentives is less than one, like in this case, it means that for one 
ruble increase in revenues, municipalities in this region on average lose more than one ruble in transfers or 
in revenues from shared sources. 
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them to affect the administrative effort of revenue collections, their informal powers were 
quite substantial, especially in those days when tax arrears were rampant and extracting 
taxes from corporate taxpayers sometimes became more a political issue rather than an 
administrative one.19 In accord with this view, Shleifer and Treisman (2000), Treisman 
(2000), and Cai and Treisman (2004) argue that regional administrations shielded firms 
in their regions from the federal tax collectors as they could influence local branches of 
federal courts and tax collection agencies. This argument could be extended to the local 
governments as well. 
Even more relevant to our discussion is the argument that has been put forward by 
Bahl and Wallich (1995) and Martinez-Vazquez et al. (2006), that out of three tiers of 
Russia’ government (federal, regional, and local) territorial subdivisions of the federal 
Ministry of Taxation are most strongly influenced by local authorities. 
In particular, there are several tools that could be used by local authorities to 
manipulate the tax burden carried by businesses inside their borders. The practice when 
taxpayers were allowed to defer their tax obligations for a number of years and had been 
relieved of any penalties if they promised to start paying current obligations is one 
example. In this case municipalities can directly affect the amount of tax revenues 
collected in their budgets. 
Another possibility for local governments to decrease tax burden on local 
businesses is to turn a blind eye on underground economy, and to discourage local tax 
police from being too eager when uncovering those businesses that choose to stay in 
                                                 
19 For example, numerous Provisional Emergency Commissions for Enforcing Tax Discipline that 
were active in Russia in 1990s invariably included the heads of local administrations of those jurisdictions 
where persistent tax avoiders resided. 
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shadow. The estimates of the underground economy in Russia in 1990s vary from 20% to 
27% of GDP,20 which  gives local governments plenty of room for manipulation of the 
size of their legal tax revenues as they decide how hard they should squeeze the informal 
sector. In this case municipalities can indirectly affect the amount of tax revenues 
collected in their budgets as the taxpayers who leave the shadow economy have to pay 
taxes to all levels of the government, including local budgets. 
The latter instrument might not allow local governments to affect the mix of tax 
revenues collected from the taxpayers located in their jurisdictions (e.g., the local shares 
of federal taxes could not be paid to local budgets without regional and federal shared 
taxes being paid as well), but it might let them affect the flow of tax collections as a 
whole, i.e., the proceeds to the consolidated budget of the Russian Federation from the 
territory of the municipality. In this case those municipalities that are facing stronger 
disincentives resulting from the revenue clawback will be encouraged to reduce 
collections to their budgets, and they might be able to do it only by affecting the 
collections from all levels of the budgetary systems: local, regional, and federal. 
The empirical hypothesis in this case should be that in those municipalities that 
are facing stronger revenue clawbacks (i.e., weaker fiscal incentives) resulting from 
regional equalization programs, revenue collections to the consolidated budget of the 
Russian Federation should be smaller. 
An ideal way to test this hypothesis would be to regress the size of the budget 
revenues collected into consolidated budget of the Russian Federation in individual 
municipalities on fiscal incentives that they were facing and a set of control variables that 
                                                 
20 See for example Schneider and Enste (2000) 
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characterize each municipality. The magnitude of the fiscal incentives would not vary 
across municipalities inside regions, but only across the regions themselves because of 
the assumption that all municipalities in a particular region are facing the same fiscal 
incentives being exposed to the same equalization program. However, as neither 
statistical data nor the data on tax collections are available at the local level, we need to 
rely on the data that are aggregated at the regional level and modify the above hypothesis 
to test the following one: the size of tax and non-tax revenues of the regions’ 
consolidated budgets, all other things being equal, is smaller in those regions where 
municipalities are facing lower fiscal incentives (i.e., higher revenue clawbacks). The 
idea is that the effect from individual municipalities being less interested in more 
effective revenue collections in their borders will sum up and will produce the aggregate 
effect on the regional level. 
When using this aggregation, we should assume that the willingness of the 
regions themselves to collect more or less revenues into their budgets is not correlated 
with the degree of equalization in the region. If those regions that pursue stronger 
equalization and, accordingly, expose their municipalities to higher revenue clawbacks 
are also more protective towards their businesses and are more willing to cover their 
shadow economy from federal tax collectors, then the reinforcing bias will be present in 
our estimates as the lower level of tax collections resulting from the effect of equalization 
on behavior of the municipalities will be reinforced by the regions’ actions. We do not 
see why this kind of correlation should take place, and rather would worry about the 
opposite effect–that those regions that take more aggressive approach to equalization 
could compensate the negative incentives resulting from lower fiscal incentives with 
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higher effort to collect revenues into the consolidated budget of the Russian Federation, 
making sure that both local and regional budgets receive enough revenues. If this effect is 
taking place then our analysis will not show the positive relationship between the level of 
fiscal incentives and consolidated revenues of regional budgets. 
Another omitted variable in our model is the level of tax relief provided both by 
local and by regional governments. As always in the case of omitted variables, it is 
important that they are not correlated with the explanatory variable of interest, i.e., that 
tax relieves are not correlated with the degree of equalization in the regions. 
Having all these considerations in mind, we proceed to the estimation of the 
following empirical model: 
  ln(Effort t,i) = a + b1*FI t,i +  b2*OIL t,i + b3*URBAN t,i + b4*POP t.i  
           + b5*FC t,i + b6*DEN t,i + b7*TRANS t,i  
          + b8*Y1999+ b9*Y2000+ b10*Y2001+ et                                              (4.23) 
where Effort ti–the ratio of tax and non-tax revenues of consolidated regional 
budget to the measure of fiscal capacity of the region (see below the explanation how 
fiscal capacity is measured). 
FI ti–the estimate of fiscal incentives for municipalities k from equation (4.22); 
OIL ti–the ratio of monetary value of oil and gas extracted in the region (i.e., the amount 
of oil and gas extracted in the region multiplied by current price of oil) to its gross 
regional product. 
POP–population of the region, in thousands of people. 
FC–the size of fiscal capacity of the region as calculated for the purpose of distribution of 
federal equalization grants among the regions. 
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Fiscal capacity shows how much revenues should be collected in a region given 
its structure of gross regional product. The idea is that the value added in different 
industries brings different amounts of tax revenues (e.g., in Russia agricultural output is 
taxed much lighter than the output of the oil extracting and oil refining industries). Fiscal 
capacity is a more accurate estimate of the ability of the regions to collect taxes and using 
this parameter instead of simple gross regional product improves the significance of our 
estimates.21 
URBAN–share of urban population. 
DENS–size of population of the region divided by the size of its territory (people per sq. 
km). 
TRANSF–transfers from the federal to regional budget, including all monetary grants 
(resources from the fund of financial support of the regions, earmarked subsidies, etc.) 
Indexes t and i indicate year t and region i. 
We use ordinary least squares estimation method as well as fixed and random 
effect models to estimate parameters in equation (4.23). 
Table 3 shows the estimates of the coefficients of the variables in equation (4.23). 
                                                 
21 For a detailed explanation of how fiscal capacity of the regions are calculated see Appendix II. 
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Table 3 
Estimation Results for Equation (4.23) 
 
Independent variables OLS Fixed Effect Random Effect 
Fiscal incentives 0.075* 
(0.03) 
0.050 
(0.026) 
0.052* 
(0.03) 
Oil 0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.005* 
(0.003) 
Share of Urban Population -0.01* 
(0.002) 
- -0.006* 
(0.003) 
Population 0.0001* 
(0.00002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.0001* 
(0.00003) 
Fiscal Capacity per capita 0.001 
(0.0005) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.002* 
(0.0005) 
Population Density 0.002* 
(0.001) 
- 0.001 
(0.001) 
Transfers from federal budget 0.0001* 
(0.00003) 
0.0001 
(0.001) 
0.0001* 
(0.0001) 
Y1999 -0.36* 
(0.05) 
-0.35* 
(0.04) 
-0.37* 
(0.03) 
Y2000 -0.39* 
(0.05) 
-0.32* 
(0.06) 
-0.39* 
(0.04) 
Y2001 -0.59* 
(0.06) 
-0.52* 
(0.09) 
-0.61* 
(0.05) 
Constant -1.74* 
(-11.52) 
-7.79* 
(3.95) 
-1.70* 
(0.22) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*The coefficient is different from zero at the 5% significance level. 
 
The results related to the estimates of the coefficients of the control variables on 
the tax effort are not easy to interpret, even though most of them are statistically 
significant at the 5% level. The negative sign of the estimate for the coefficient that 
shows the effect of the oil and gas extraction in the region is rather puzzling. It might 
mean that the affluent firms involved into oil and gas business in 1990s and early 2000s 
were successful in avoiding tax payments. A lower level of tax effort in the regions with 
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a larger share of urban population is also counterintuitive as we would expect the tax 
administrators to be more efficient in urban areas. Regions with larger population seem to 
produce a larger tax effort as does population density (which is not quite consistent with 
the negative effect of share of urban population on tax effort). The size of per capita 
fiscal capacity also positively affects the level of tax effort in the regions as well as the 
share of transfers from the federal budget in regional budgets. 
The estimates for the coefficient of the variable of interest, fiscal incentives, are in 
agreement with our hypothesis that in those regions where municipalities are facing 
higher fiscal incentives the level of revenue collections is higher as indicated by the 
positive sign of the coefficient. 
For all but one specification of the model, we can not reject the hypothesis that 
the fiscal incentives faced by municipalities in the regions positively affect the size of the 
regions’ consolidated  revenue collections as share of adjusted fiscal capacity (i.e., tax 
effort). The fixed effect specification of the model does not provide an estimate that is 
significant at a 5% significance level, but the  point estimate is still positive. 
The estimates of coefficient b1 in equation (4.23) that measures the effect of fiscal 
incentives on the size of revenue collections as share of adjusted gross regional product 
(i.e., tax effort) vary from 0.075 in the OLS specification to 0.052 in the random effect 
specification.  
The magnitude of the estimate is rather small: according to random effect model, 
which is favored by the Hausman test, it is equal to 0.052 or 5.2%. Because in our model 
we use the logarithm of dependent variable, the coefficient b1 measures the semi-
elasticity of tax effort with respect to fiscal incentives, which means that as fiscal 
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incentives change by one unit (e.g., from 0 to 1), the tax effort in a region changes by 
5.2%. Note that a one unit change in fiscal incentives is a substantial change because it 
could mean a change from complete equalization (fiscal incentives equal to -1, i.e., 
complete revenue clawback) to no equalization at all (fiscal incentives equal to 0, i.e., no 
revenue clawback at all). 
The positive sign of the coefficient tells us that higher fiscal incentives–larger in 
absolute value when positive and smaller in absolute value when negative–result in a 
higher revenue collections given the size of the region’s fiscal capacity, which is 
consistent with our hypothesis. 
There are two important implications of this result. First, it is consistent with our 
theoretical model that shows that equalization programs that are based on actual revenue 
collections might make consumption of publicly provided goods relatively more 
expensive and create a substantial effect that discourages equalized municipalities from 
consuming publicly provided goods and, accordingly, reduce local governments’ effort in 
enhancing revenue collections in their municipalities. Second, this result is consistent 
with our argument that, despite the lack of formal administrative powers toward 
territorial subdivisions of the federal Ministry of Taxation, local governments still might 
have the necessary tools and effective mechanisms that allow them to influence the size 
of revenue collections in their municipalities. 
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The Case of the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area Fiscal Disparities Program 
The tax base sharing program established in the Twin Cities metropolitan area 
taxes a certain portion of commercial and industrial properties and redistributes the 
proceeds among municipalities in direct proportion to their population size and in inverse 
proportion to their real property (which includes commercial and industrial property as 
well as residential property). The theoretical model developed earlier shows that the 
equalization programs of this kind produce a substitution effect that decreases presence of 
businesses in the equalized area, consequently reducing the size of commercial and 
industrial property in the jurisdictions that are subject to equalization. Accordingly, in 
this section we test the proposition that the fiscal disparities program negatively affected 
the size of commercial and industrial property in the municipalities that are included in 
the tax base sharing program. 
Description of the Program 
The official statutory name of the program is the Charles R. Weaver Metropolitan 
Revenue Distribution Act, but it is often referred to by its nickname, the “fiscal 
disparities program.” It was enacted in 1971, but court challenges prevented the 
program’s implementation until 1975. This program is codified in Minnesota Statutes, 
chapter 473F, and it affects all taxing jurisdictions (i.e., counties, cities, towns, schools 
districts, and special taxing districts) located in the Twin Cities Metropolitan area. 
Originally, the objectives of the program included six components, three of which 
emphasized the goals of sharing, help, and establishing incentives for all parts of the area 
to work for the growth of the area as a whole. Two others focused on a reduction of fiscal 
considerations on the location of businesses and protection of the environment, and one 
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objective declared that resources should stay at the local level when redistributed. Later, 
these objectives were reconsidered, and currently they include two major goals: 1) 
promoting more orderly regional development, and 2) improving equity in the 
distribution of fiscal resources. 
The program works as if 40 percent of all commercial-industrial (C/I) property 
that developed in the jurisdiction since 197122 was removed from local taxing authority 
(contributed tax base), accumulated in a pool, and then redistributed among jurisdictions 
in direct proportion to the size of their population and in inverse proportion to their per 
capita real property (distributed tax base). 
Contributions to the Areawide Tax Base 
The fiscal disparities law requires that each taxing jurisdiction to contribute 40 
percent of the growth in its C/I property tax base since the 1971 assessment to an 
areawide pool. C/I property includes all businesses, offices, stores, warehouses, factories, 
gas stations, parking ramps, etc. It also includes public utility property and vacant land 
that is zoned commercial or industrial, but most personal C/I property is exempt from 
taxation under the program. The growth in property includes the total net change in net 
tax capacity since 1971, including the effects of new construction, inflation, demolition, 
revaluation, appreciation, and depreciation. 
A property’s net tax capacity is determined by multiplying the property’s taxable 
market value by the relevant class rate or rates. Class rates are set by statute, vary by 
property type, and are uniform statewide. 
                                                 
22 Even though the program was implemented in 1975, the 1971 assessment remains the 
benchmark year. 
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From the net tax capacity of the industrial and commercial parcel j in the area Vj 
its net tax capacity in the base year of 1971, V0j, is subtracted. 
The leftover, V1j= Vj - V0j is the change in the net tax capacity since 1971 for the 
parcel j. 
The net tax capacity in the base year of 1971, V0j, and 60% of the change in the 
net tax capacity since 1971, V1j, are taxed by the local government at a local rate ti. 
40% of the change in the net tax capacity of parcel j since 1971, V1j, is assigned to 
the areawide base. 
The tax capacity contributed by jurisdiction i to the areawide base is 
, where m is the number of C/I parcels in the jurisdiction. ∑
=
⋅=
m
j
ji VC
1
14.0
Total size of the areawide tax base in the metro area is determined as the sum of 
all jurisdictions’ contribution:  ∑
=
=
n
i
iCC
1
 Distribution from Areawide Tax Base 
Each locality is assigned a share si in the area wide base C:  
 ∑= iii I
Is ,                                                                    (4.24) 
where 
i
ii FC
FCpopI = , 
where popi–is the population of the locality i,  
FCi–its per capita fiscal capacity, 
FC - the average across the area per capita fiscal capacity. Fiscal capacity is the market 
value of real and personal property within a locality. It is important to note that the fiscal 
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capacity here includes not only the industrial and commercial property but other types of 
property as well. 
The dollar value of the share in the area wide base C assigned to the jurisdiction i: 
. Thus the revenues that a locality receives after the tax base sharing: CsD ii ⋅=
)6.0( 10 iiiii DVVtR +⋅+= , where the first two components in parentheses represent the 
revenues that come from taxing C/I property in the locality, and the third component 
represents the revenues that come from taxing a jurisdiction’s share in the areawide tax 
base C. 
Impact on Individual Parcels 
As each jurisdiction applies to its distribution net tax capacity Di  its local tax rate 
ti, its levy on it is .  iii DtL =
The total areawide levy is , and the areawide tax rate is ∑= n
i
iLL C
Lt wa =/ . 
Each C/I parcel’s net tax capacity is split into an areawide portion and a local 
portion according to the following ratio:  
i
iwa
i CapacityTaxCITotal
Cs
___
/ = ,  
where Ci is the tax capacity contributed by jurisdiction i as defined above, and 
Total_CI_Tax_Capacityi is total C/I tax capacity in jurisdiction i. 
This ratio determines the portion of each C/I parcel’s net capacity that pays a tax 
determined by the areawide tax rate ta/w. The rest of the parcel’s net tax capacity pays a 
tax determined by the local tax rate tl. 
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Thus, is the areawide portion of property tax paid by the C/I parcel, and 
is the local portion of property tax paid by the C/I parcel. 
was /
)1( / was−
Figure 4.3 illustrates how the tax base sharing mechanism works. 
Figure 3: Graphical Illustration of the Fiscal Disparities Program 
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 Apparently the provision that instead of sharing some specific portion of 
commercial and industrial property in the metropolitan area, the difference between the 
current tax capacity and the tax capacity in the benchmark year (1971) should be shared 
has been implemented in the program to allow it to gain its effect gradually as the tax 
bases grow due to inflation, growth in property values, and economic development of the 
area. For the purpose of our analysis it would have been more desirable if the program 
had taken full effect as soon as it was introduced. We should be careful in interpreting the 
results of our empirical analysis because, besides the effect of the tax base sharing 
program that has been gradually increasing in its magnitude since 1974, some other 
factors could have been introduced that affected the distribution of C/I property inside 
and outside of the metropolitan area. 
Figure 4 and Table B1 in Appendix III show how metro areawide tax base was 
growing in 1975-2004 as a percentage of total metro commercial and industrial tax bases. 
In 1975 the share of the area wide pool in total metro commercial-industrial tax 
base was only about 7 %, ten years later in 1985 it reached 24 %, by 1995 it was at the 
level of 26 %, and currently it exceeds 32 %. Accordingly, it means that currently more 
than 80 % of the existing commercial and industrial tax bases in the Twin Cities 
Metropolitan area represents the increase in the value since 1971, and is being shared 
according to the program. (0.80*0.40=0.32). What is important for the purpose of our 
analysis is that for more than ten years about a third of all commercial and industrial 
property in the Twin Cities area has been taxed at a uniform areawide tax rate and the 
revenues redistributed among jurisdictions in the area. Effectively, it means that in our 
 76
theoretical model the tax rate at which the property is taxed for further redistribution 
should be adjusted according to this ratio (i.e., the effective tax rate will be 32% of the 
actual areawide tax rate). 
A decrease in the share of the area-wide pool in total metro C/I tax bases in mid-
1990s resulted from a slump in C/I real estate values in that period of time. 
Figure 4: Percentage of Total Metro Commercial and Industrial Tax Base Comprised by 
the Area-Wide Pool, 1975-2004 
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On the expenditure side this program adjusts per capita amount of commercial 
and industrial tax bases assigned to a municipality in inverse proportion to the 
municipality’s per capita size of real property.23 We rearrange equation (4.24) to show 
more explicitly the relationship between the size of per capita commercial and industrial 
tax base that is assigned to a municipality and the size of its per capita real property: 
                                                 
23 All real property includes residential homes, town homes, condominiums, apartments, 
commercial and industrial property, and vacant land. 
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                                       (4.25) 
where  is the municipality’s per capita size of real property (fiscal capacity,) 
 is jurisdictions’ population size, and 
iFC
jpop
N is the total number of jurisdictions participating in the program. 
Formula (4.25) shows that the larger per capita real property in a municipality, the 
smaller is the size of commercial and industrial tax base assigned to the municipality 
according to the program. It results in a tax base clawback effect as the increase in own 
per capita real property brings a decrease in the size of per capita assigned commercial 
and industrial tax bases. Similar to the gap-filling equalization scheme described in the 
theoretical section, this kind of equalization formula would also result in a substitution 
effect encouraging municipalities to reduce the presence of commercial and industrial 
firms inside their borders. 
The clawback effect on the municipalities’ per capita real property resulting from 
the distributional formula could be estimated by differentiating the formula with respect 
to the size of fiscal capacity of the municipalities: 
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The negative sign of equation (4.26) shows that the size of per capita commercial 
and industrial tax base assigned to a municipality and its fiscal capacity move in the 
opposite directions, i.e., as per capita real property in a municipality increases, the size of 
per capita commercial and industrial property redistributed to this municipality goes 
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down and vise versa. Moreover, this inverse relationship is larger for municipalities with 
lower per capita real property: as fiscal capacity goes down, the magnitude of the 
clawback goes up in the quadratic proportion.  
For municipalities with a very low level of fiscal capacity, increasing its size 
could be even self-defeating if the magnitude of clawback is larger than unity, which 
means that the gain in their own fiscal capacity will result in a larger decrease in the 
shared tax base that is assigned according to the program. In other words, for 
municipalities with very small fiscal capacity a decrease in per capita redistributed 
commercial and industrial property overcompensates for the increase in per capita real 
property when the latter goes up. 
The condition for this situation is presented by the following expression: 
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FC                                     (4.27) 
In such a case, unless some other considerations induce them to do otherwise, 
municipalities with low per capita real property will be discouraged from allowing their 
per capita real property to grow (e.g., by tightening their zoning laws). Moreover, they 
might be even encouraged to suppress their per capita real property (e.g., by tightening 
loval regulations and by increasing local tax burden on businesses located inside their 
borders) because, if the magnitude of the clawback is larger than unity, a decrease in their 
own per capita real property will be more than compensated by the increase in per capita 
commercial and industrial property that is shared with them. 
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We estimate the magnitude of this disincentive effect using data for year 2003 for 
a sample of 138 cities in the Twin Cities Metropolitan. The disincentives measured by 
absolute value of (4.26) vary from 0.005 for the richest city in terms of per capita 
property tax base (Woodland, $3,360 in total tax capacity per capita) to 3.323 for the 
poorest city in terms of per capita property tax base (Landfall, $144 in total tax capacity 
per capita). The latter is the only city that according to the simulation has the magnitude 
of disincentive larger than 1. Figure 5 shows the level of disincentives that the cities were 
facing according to the simulation: 
Figure 5: Disincentives Faced by Cities in Seven-County Twin Cities Metropolitan Area 
(Simulation), 2003 
0.000
0.500
1.000
1.500
2.000
2.500
3.000
3.500
 
Table 4 shows the real property tax base disincentives are distributed among cities 
of Seven-County Twin Cities metropolitan area. 
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Table 4  
Frequency and Cumulative Percentage of the Real Property Tax Base Disincentives for 
Cities in the Seven-County Twin Cites Metropolitan Area 
 
Bin Frequency Cumulative % 
0.1 58 42.03% 
0.2 53 80.43% 
0.3 18 93.48% 
0.4 6 97.83% 
0.5 0 97.83% 
0.6 1 98.55% 
0.7 0 98.55% 
0.8 0 98.55% 
0.9 1 99.28% 
1 0 99.28% 
More 1 100.00% 
 
According to Table 3, 58 cities (42% of total number) were facing real property 
tax base disincentives that were smaller than 0.1. For 53 cities, the disincentive was in the 
range between 0.1 and 0.20, for 18 cities–between 0.2 and 0.3, for 6 cities–between 0.3 
and 0.4, and for 3 cities the disincentives were larger than 0.5: 0.563 for New Trier, 0.856 
for Hilltop, and 3.323 for Landfall. Thus, more than a half of the cities were facing real 
tax base disincentives larger than 0.1. 
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Figure 6: Fiscal Capacity and per capita Commercial and Industrial Shared Tax Bases, 
Simulation, Dollars 
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Figure 6 shows that one municipality, the one with the lowest per capita real 
property, Landfall, ends up getting a higher tax base size than ten other municipalities 
(which have with higher per capita real property) after the shared commercial and 
industrial tax bases are assigned to them. 
Empirical Estimation 
The presence of two disincentive effects described above allows us to put forward 
an empirical hypothesis that the program has negatively affected the size of commercial 
and industrial properties in the municipalities located in the seven-county metro area due 
to the effect of the areawide taxation resulting from the revenue side of the program and 
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due to the effect of clawback on real property resulting from the expenditure side of the 
program.24
The Sample 
As explained above, the fiscal disparities program affects all taxing jurisdictions 
in the Seven-County Twin Cities Metropolitan Area: counties, school districts, special tax 
districts, cities and townships. We use a sample of cities as opposed to other types of 
taxing jurisdictions because cities constitute the largest group of taxing jurisdictions for 
which the necessary data are available. 
The total number of cities included in the program varies according to different 
sources. For example, according to the website of the Twin Cities’ Metropolitan Council 
there are 2 central and 143 other cities in the area, i.e., 145 cities total.25 The data 
provided by the Center for Small Towns26 include population for 138 cities, while a 
report27 prepared by the House Research Department of the Minnesota House of 
Representatives refers to 139 cities included in the program as of 2004. 
Our sample of 110 cities that are affected by the program (i.e., cities that are 
located inside the Seven-County Twin Cities Metropolitan Area) includes all cities inside 
the metropolitan area for which the necessary data are available. Accordingly, these cities 
are located in the seven counties that comprise the Seven-County Twin Cities 
Metropolitan area: Anoka, Carver, Dakota, Hennepin, Ramsey, Scott, and Washington 
(see Figure 7). 
                                                 
24 The latter effect should take place because commercial and industrial properties are included in 
fiscal capacity as a part of real property. 
25 http://www.metrocouncil.org/metroarea/FiscalDisparities/index.htm 
26 http://www.morris.umn.edu/services/cst/index.htm 
27 Minnesota’s Fiscal Disparities Programs, Twin Cities Metropolitan Area and Iron Range 
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 Figure 7: Fiscal Disparities Program Geographic Area:  
Seven-County Twin Cities Metropolitan Area and Surrounding Counties 
 
 
 
The sample of the cities that are not affected by the program is based on 
geographical proximity of their location to the metropolitan area: to balance the sample 
of the cities located inside the metropolitan area I select a sample of 110 cities located 
outside its borders, but as close as possible to the metropolitan area (measured by driving 
time to Minneapolis).28 These cities are located in 21 counties that surround the Seven-
County Twin Cities Metropolitan area (see Figure 4.6). Finally, the total number of cities 
in our sample is 220 (i.e., 110 cities inside the metro area and 110 cities outside of the 
metro area). 
                                                 
28 Out of three cities located in the longest driving time (93 minutes) I drop the one that is located 
in the longest driving distance, leaving the total number of cities located outside the metro area in my 
sample equal to 110. 
 84
Cities from Wisconsin are not included in our sample of cities located outside the 
metro area despite the fact that some of them are located closer to its borders than some 
of the cities from Minnesota in our sample. For example, Hudson, WI is located just on 
the border with Washington county that is included in the Twin Cities Metropolitan area, 
and is only in 34 minutes of driving time from Minneapolis. I exclude the cities from 
Wisconsin for two reasons: first, when we compare cities inside and outside the 
metropolitan area it is preferable for them to be in the same state to keep as many things 
equal as possible. 
Empirical Model and Hypothesis 
In our empirical model we use a dummy variable that shows whether a city is 
located inside the seven-county metro area (metro dummy is equal to 1) or outside of it 
(metro dummy is equal to 0). The estimation of the coefficient for the metro dummy is of 
key importance for our analysis as it tells us whether the size of per capita commercial 
and industrial property inside the metro area is lower than its size outside of the metro 
area. As explained above, we expect it to be the case because the fiscal disparities 
program implemented in the Twin Cities Metropolitan area creates two price effects that 
discourage jurisdictions from allowing businesses to located inside their borders: first, 
resulting from its revenue side (i.e., taxation of commercial and industrial property) and, 
second, resulting from its expenditure side (i.e., distribution of commercial and industrial 
property among municipalities in the inverse proportion to the size of their per capita real 
property). 
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Table 5 shows descriptive statistics for per capita commercial and industrial 
property in cities in our sample distinguishing between cities located inside the seven-
county area and cities located outside of the area. 
Table 5  
Descriptive Statistics: per capita Commercial and Industrial Property  
in the Cities in Our Sample 
 
 Outside Seven-
County Area 
Inside Seven-
County Area 
Total 
Max 30,350 52,047 52,047
Min 173.1 1,092.4 173.1
Average (simple) 6,928.0 10,995.7 8,961.9
Average (weighted) 10,177.6 14,952.8 13,982.6
Standard Deviation 5,175.8 9,431.1 7,858.7
Coefficient of 
Variation 
0.51 0.63 0.56
 
Besides the metropolitan area dummy we should include in the model other 
parameters that might affect the size of per capita commercial and industrial property. In 
our choice of explanatory variables we partly rely on the previous literature that analyzes 
the effect of local fiscal policies on business location using the data aggregated at the 
localities’ level, Fox (1981), McHone (1986), McHone (1990), and we also add some 
other explanatory variables. 
The resulting empirical model is given by equation (4.21): 
POPRESLAPPAFYTX
DENTIMECIMETROCI
lnlnlnln
lnlnln
1098765
43197221
ββββββ
ββββα
+++++
+++++=
                   (4.28) 
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where CI–market values of commercial and industrial property per capita in the 
city in 2003, 
METRO–dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the city is located inside the 
metro area, and zero otherwise. 
TIME–driving time in minutes from the city to the center of the metropolitan area 
(i.e., Minneapolis), 
CI1972–assessed valuation of commercial and industrial property per capita in the 
city in 1972, 
DEN–population density per square mile of land area in the city in 2000, 
Y–median family income in the city in 2000 (in 1999 prices), 
RES–residential property market values per capita in the city in 2003, 
TX–the average tax rates for county, city, school and special districts within the 
city in 2003, 
PAF–police and fire protection expenditures per capita in the city in 2005, 
LAP–library and park expenditures per capita in the city in 2005, 
POP–population of the city, 2003. 
Market values of commercial and industrial properties for year 2003, CI, are 
expressed in per capita terms to take account of differences in city size. The population 
data by which the commercial and industrial property are divided are from population 
census 2000. We assume that the three year discrepancy should not create a problem in 
this case. 
The metro dummy, METRO, is of major importance in our analysis as it shows 
whether the city is located inside of the metro area and, accordingly, is either affected by 
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the fiscal disparities program or not. As those cities that are located inside the metro area 
are facing price effects that discourage them from allowing businesses to locate inside 
their borders, we expect that the sign of the estimate for the coefficient for this parameter 
is negative. 
Driving time from the city to the center of the metropolitan area,29 TIME, reflects 
the attractiveness of the city for firms as a place of location. As the proximity of central 
business district is a major attraction for commercial and industrial firms, the expected 
effect of driving time to the center of the metropolitan area on commercial and industrial 
property is negative. We use driving time instead of driving distance as driving time 
better reflects location convenience.30  
Including in our model per capita assessed valuation of commercial and industrial 
property in the city in 1972, CI1972, allows us to control for the size of commercial and 
industrial property before the fiscal disparities program was introduced. The expected 
effect of this parameter on the size of per capita commercial and industrial property 
values in 2003 is positive as it is likely that those cities that were attractive for businesses 
in 1972 would keep their attractiveness in 2003 everything else being equal. 
The population density of a city, DEN, is expected to be negatively related to its 
willingness to accept commercial and industrial development because higher population 
density means that there is less space for stores and factories in the city and that, 
assuming that they mostly produce negative externalities, these might affect residents 
more severely. 
                                                 
29 Accessed 1 June 2007, available from www.mapquest.com. 
30 For example, of two cities that are located in 50 miles from the central business district, the one 
accessible by a highway will be more attractive than the one, accessible by rural roads (assuming no traffic 
jams on the highway, of course). 
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Both median family income in the city, Y, and residential property per capita in 
the city, RES, should negatively affect the size of commercial and industrial property in 
the city because richer individuals who own more expensive houses are less willing to 
accept commercial and industrial development in their neighborhoods, assuming again 
that this development mostly produces negative externalities. 
The tax price for commercial and industrial property development, TX, is 
represented by average tax rates for county, school and special districts within the city, 
and its effect on per capita commercial and industrial property is expected to be negative. 
There are also two components of local budget expenditures that might affect 
attractiveness of the city for commercial and industrial development: police and fire 
protection expenditures and local expenditures for library and parks. 
Police and fire protection expenditures per capita in the city, PAF, should 
positively affect the size of commercial and industrial property values in the city as these 
services benefit commercial and industrial firms located in its borders. 
As suggested in the previous literature, 31 those local budget expenditures that 
benefit local residents as opposed to local firms should negatively affect commercial and 
industrial development in communities. Thus we would expect that per capita 
expenditures for library and parks, LAP, will negatively affect the size of commercial and 
industrial property values in the city. 
Finally, the size of the city’s population, POP, should positively affect per capita 
commercial and industrial development as a larger population might mean easier access 
to labor market. 
                                                 
31 See for example McHone (1986) 
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Results 
The parameters of empirical model represented by (4.28) are estimated using 
OLS. The results of the estimation are presented by (4.29): 
 
POPRESLAPPAFYTX
DENTIMECIMETROCI
ln16.ln36.001.002.ln94.ln19.
ln15.01.ln33.38.7.13ln
)*10.4()*28.2()92(.)*68.2()*81.2()79(.
)*55.2()*98.3(1972)*01.7()*28.2(
++++−−
−−+−=
             (4.29) 
Adjusted R2 = .46, number of observations = 220. 
 
The t-statistic for each variable’s coefficient is given in parentheses underneath it. 
The statistical significance of the individual coefficients is indicated by an asterisk for a 
5% significance level. 
For the most of the control variables in our model, the signs and statistical 
significance of the estimated coefficients match our expectations: the level of commercial 
and industrial development in a city in 1972, police and fire expenditures from its budget 
in 2005 as well as the population size positively affected the level of its commercial and 
industrial development, while longer driving time to the center of the metropolitan area, 
higher population density and higher median family income affected it negatively. All 
these variables have coefficients that are statistically significant at the 5% level.  
The expected negative effect on commercial and industrial development in a city 
resulting from higher level of taxation and expenditures on libraries and parks is not 
confirmed by our empirical estimation: despite having the expected negative sign, the 
estimates of the appropriate coefficients for these variables in our model are not 
statistically significant at a 5% level. 
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For one control variable in our model, per capita size of residential property in a 
city, the estimated coefficient has an unexpected sign and is also statistically significant 
at the 5% level. According to this estimate, larger per capita residential property values in 
a city are associated with a larger level of commercial and industrial development in its 
borders.  
The key result of our  empirical analysis is that the coefficient for METRO is 
negative and is statistically different from zero at the 5% significance level. This result is 
consistent with our hypothesis that other things being equal in the cities located in the 
Twin Cities Metropolitan area the per capita level of commercial and industrial 
development is lower as the fiscal disparities program discourages municipalities from 
accepting businesses inside their borders. Because the dependent variable enters the 
equation (4.29) in the logarithm form, the coefficient at METRO variable measures the 
semi-elasticity of per capita commercial and industrial property values with respect to 
changes in metro dummy, i.e., when multiplied by 100 it tells us the number of 
percentage points by which the explained variable will change when the explanatory 
variable changes by one unit. Accordingly, the sign and the magnitude of the coefficient 
tells us that the level of commercial and industrial development in a city as measured by 
its per capita commercial and industrial property values is 38% lower inside the 
metropolitan area than outside of it, other things being equal, which indicates rather large 
economic significance of the variable. The estimate of the coefficient is quite robust as it 
consistently stays in the range of 30-40% as we varied the specifications of the model and 
changed the functional form of the control variables entering the equation. 
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It is important to note that this result does not mean that per capita commercial 
and industrial property values in the cities located inside of the seven-county area are 
lower than in the cities located outside of the area. On contrary, the descriptive statistics 
for our data in Table 4 shows that our sample of cities located in the seven-county Twin 
Cities metro area has larger per capita commercial and industrial property values. In 
terms of our model, on average for the cities located inside the tax base sharing area their 
proximity to the central cities (inversely related to the driving time to Minneapolis) 
outweighs the negative effect of the metro dummy. The fact that a city is affected by the 
fiscal disparities program negatively affects its per capita commercial and industrial 
property values, but it does not mean that this factor will always prevail. 
When interpreting these findings we should take into account the possibility that 
some other factors might have contributed to the lower level of commercial and industrial 
development in the cities located in the seven-county Twin Cities area as compared with 
the cities located in the surrounding counties. In his evaluation of the Twin Cities 
metropolitan area tax base sharing, Reschovsky (1980) refers to Minnesota’s land 
planning legislation and to a regional comprehensive plan instituted by Metropolitan 
Council as to instruments intended to control or at least influence the location of business 
activity in the area and argues that these changes in Minnesota development policies 
made statistical analysis of the tax base sharing program extremely difficult. 
My review of the Minnesota Land Planning Act (MLPA) and a number of cities’ 
comprehensive plans shows that there is no clear restriction on commercial and industrial 
development implemented in this law. Basically, it requires jurisdictions within the 
metropolitan area to develop comprehensive plans that show the planned pattern of 
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development in their borders and to make sure that these plans are in agreement with the 
current Regional Development Framework. This is a very general document, and it does 
not specify any particular restrictions on growth. Its summary is presented in Appendix 
IV. 
Apparently, there is no reason for these policies to intervene with commercial and 
industrial development in the Twin Cities metropolitan area. On contrary, if the first set 
of the policies achieves its goals, the result should be an improvement in the area’s 
economic (i.e., commercial and industrial) development in the metropolitan area. 
Still, we should not disregard the possibility that some other region-specific 
factors that we are not aware of have contributed to the lower level of commercial and 
industrial property values in the seven-county area included in the fiscal disparities 
program. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSION 
Given the importance of equalization programs, which comprise a significant part 
of subnational government revenues in many countries, the study of the unintended 
consequences of equalization programs is important both for academic research and for 
policy making. The major theme of this dissertation is to show that, even though 
equalization is achieved by means of unconditional grants that are not supposed to 
influence governments' policies and residents' behavior of the equalized jurisdictions, 
equalization programs might produce substitution effects that result in changes in the 
residents’ consumption of those goods that are related to the factors that are used as 
measures of jurisdictions’ fiscal capacity, followed by appropriate changes in local 
governments’ policies. Depending on the choice of the factors that are used to measure 
jurisdictions’ ability to raise budget revenues, equalization programs could suppress 
either revenue collections in the equalized jurisdictions or the size of their tax bases. 
As a part of a general problem of disincentives created by equalization, we study 
the case of Russia where regions distribute equalization grants among their constituent 
municipalities based on their actual revenue collections. As different regions pursue 
different degrees of equalization, the disincentives produced by their equalization 
programs vary across regions, which allows us to test the hypothesis that a higher degree 
of equalization, which our model predicts produces a stronger substitution effect, should 
be associated with lower revenue collections in a region. 
In this part of our work we develop a new approach that allows us to calculate 
fiscal incentives faced by municipalities when the sharing rates of shared taxes assigned 
 94
to them by regions vary from year to year. Using this approach we estimate fiscal 
incentives faced by municipalities in 47 regions of Russia in a four-year time period of 
1998-2001 at the first stage, and at the second stage we use those estimates to measure 
the effect of fiscal incentives on the size of revenue collections in the regions. 
The empirical evidence from the Russia’s case is consistent with the hypothesis 
that equalization programs that are based on the actual revenue collections by equalized 
jurisdictions might discourage them from collecting their own revenues when the degree 
of equalization gets higher. The estimate of the coefficient that measures the effect of 
fiscal incentives on tax effort is different from zero at a 5% significance level and has a 
positive sign, which means that higher fiscal incentives (i.e., lower clawback or larger 
matching effect of changes in regional transfers in response to changes in municipalities’ 
own revenues) result in a higher level of tax effort in the regions.  
The magnitude of the effect that we can infer from the size of the coefficient is 
not large. As fiscal incentives change by one unit, fiscal effort in a region would change 
by 5.2%. The small effect of fiscal incentives faced by municipalities in Russia’s regions 
is not surprising given that subnational governments in Russia lack any formal powers to 
affect budget revenue collections. What is remarkable in these results is that despite the 
lack of the formal powers, we still find a statistically significant effect of fiscal incentives 
on tax effort in Russia’s regions, which implies that the fiscal incentives not only affect 
Russia’s municipalities, but also induce them to change the economic environment inside 
their borders. 
This dissertation continues the study of the effects of equalization on the size of 
tax bases in the equalized jurisdictions, which in the past have been only cursory 
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addressed by Fischel (1975, 1976) and studied more deeply by Smart (1998). Both 
Fischel (1975, 1976) and Smart (1998) argue that equalization should negatively affect 
the size of tax bases located in the equalizing area, but there was no empirical evidence 
provided to support this notion. This dissertation provides the first empirical evidence in 
the literature related to this subject as we look at the empirical evidence from the Twin 
Cities’ tax base sharing program. 
Our empirical results show that for a sample of cities located inside the seven-
county Twin Cities metropolitan area and in the surrounding counties, when controlling 
for other factors the fact that a city is included in the fiscal disparities program reduces its 
size of per capita commercial and industrial properties by 38%. The magnitude of this 
estimate not only indicates rather large economic significance of our findings for 
evaluation of the effect of the Twin Cities metropolitan area fiscal disparities program on 
economic development inside the area included in the tax base sharing program, but also 
calls for further research related to equalization programs that are based on redistribution 
of resources among jurisdictions based on the size of their tax bases. 
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APPENDIX I 
Table A1  
Estimates of the Fiscal Incentives Coefficients (Clawbacks)  
for Municipalities in Russia’s Regions 
 
No REGION 1998 1999 2000 2001
1 Bashkortostan republic - - -0.14 -0.58
2 Buryatia republic -0.47 -0.74 -0.63 -0.33
4 Kabardino-Balkaria -0.69 -0.87 0.25 -1.24
6 Karelia republic -1.17 0.39 - -
7 Komi republic - - -0.43 -0.17
8 Mari-El republic -0.80 0.12 - -
9 Mordovia republic - - - -
11 Tatarstan republic -0.58 -0.60 -0.78 0.87
13 Udmurtia republic - - - -
15 Chuvashia republic - - - -
19 Krasnoyarskiy krai - - 0.11 0.78
20 Primorskiy krai -0.17 -0.01 0.00 -0.24
23 Amurskaya oblast -0.21 -0.96 -0.55 -1.26
24 Arkhangelskaya oblast - -0.31 - -
27 Bryanskaya oblast - - -0.15 0.31
28 Vladimirskaya oblast -0.33 -0.89 0.34 1.13
29 Volgogradskaya oblast -0.01 -0.58 -0.70 0.02
31 Voronezhskaya oblast - - - -
33 Ivanovskaya oblast 0.70 0.28 - -
34 Irkutskaya oblast -0.79 -0.45 -0.77 0.22
35 Kaliningradskaya oblast - - -0.14 -0.11
36 Tverskaya oblast - - -0.91 0.39
39 Kemerovskaya oblast 0.65 -0.12 - -
40 Kirovskaya oblast - -0.25 0.16 -0.15
41 Kostromskaya oblast - - 0.41 -0.02
42 Samarskaya oblast - - -0.24 -0.23
43 Kurganskaya oblast -0.54 1.25 - -
44 Kurskaya oblast -0.58 -0.78 -1.06 -
45 Leningradskaya oblast - -0.93 -0.56 -0.31
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46 Lipetskaya oblast 0.48 -1.01 - -
47 Magadanskaya oblast 0.11 -0.76 0.11 -0.27
48 Moskovskaya oblast - - -1.04 -0.46
49 Murmanskaya oblast -0.22 -0.77 - -
52 Omskaya oblast - 0.42 -0.14 0.01
55 Penzenskaya oblast -0.68 -0.32 - -
56 Permskaya oblast -0.39 -0.17 - -
58 Rostovskaya oblast -0.22 -0.50 -1.15 -0.82
59 Ryazanskaya oblast -0.65 0.24 - -
60 Saratovskaya oblast -0.54 0.09 -0.03 -0.88
61 Sakhalinskaya oblast -0.91 -0.14 -0.41 -1.26
62 Sverdlovskaya oblast - -0.18 -0.76 -0.04
63 Smolenskaya oblast - - -0.47 0.01
64 Tambovskaya oblast - - -0.36 -1.06
65 Tomskaya oblast - - -0.10 -1.30
66 Tulskaya oblast -1.20 -0.64 - -
68 Ulyanovskaya oblast -0.84 -0.95 -0.01 0.14
70 Chitinskaya oblast - - -0.27 0.09
71 Yaroslavskaya oblast - - -0.23 -
76 Adygeya republic 0.58 -1.02 - -
78 Yevreyskaya AO - - - -
87 Khanty-Mansiyskiy AO -0.12 -0.21 - -
90 Yamalo-Nenetskiy AO - - -0.27 -0.99
 Number of estimates for 
the year: 
27 32 33 31
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APPENDIX II 
CALCULATING FISCAL CAPACITY OF RUSSIA’S REGIONS 
In this dissertation when calculating tax effort of Russia’s regions we normalize 
their revenues by fiscal capacity which is calculated by multiplying the regions’ gross 
domestic product (i.e., gross regional product or GRP) by an adjustment coefficient that 
takes into account the structure of value added and industrial output in each region and 
the tax burden on different sectors of Russia’ economy and different sectors and sub-
sectors of its industry. 
GRP and the adjustment coefficients are taken from the Methodology and 
distribution of federal transfers to the regions of Russian Federation as calculated by 
Russia’s Ministry of finance for 2003 and 2004. The calculation of fiscal capacity of the 
regions for 2003 and 2004 are based on the GRP, value added and industrial output data 
for 1998-2000 and 1999-2001 accordingly. The regions’ fiscal capacity for these years is 
calculated by averaging the data over a period of three years taken with a three-year lag. 
The idea is that this approach should delay the changes in the size of the equalization 
funds in response to changes in GRP of the regions and as a result reduce disincentives 
imposed on the regions resulting from equalization. 
For the purpose of this dissertation, we are interested in estimating the ability of 
the regions to collect the tax revenues as precise as possible without any averaging or 
delaying. Thus, when calculating tax effort for the regions in a particular year we use the 
size of their revenues as well as GDP, value added and industrial output data for that 
year. 
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To calculate fiscal capacity for 1998 and 1999-2001 we use the data from the 
Ministry of finance calculations for 2003 and 2004 accordingly. For a particular region 
the fiscal capacity (i.e., adjusted GRP) for a particular year is calculated according to 
formula (1): 
 KGRPGRP ⋅='                                                             (1) 
The adjustment coefficient K for each region takes into account 7 sectors of 
Russia’s economy, 12 sectors of industry, and 17 sub-sectors of the industry’s sectors: 
                                                     (2) ∑
=
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where Ti–the level of tax burden for sector i in Russia’s economy: 
 
i
i
i VA
RT =                                                                         (3) 
where Ri - tax revenues collected to consolidated regional budgets in Russia in 
sector i, 
VAi–value added in sector i of Russia’s economy. 
Di–share of value added in sector i in total value added in the economy of the 
region: 
 ∑= iii VA
VAD                                                                   (4) 
iVA –value added in sector i of the economy of the region. 
∑ iVA - value added in all sectors of the economy of the region. 
The first component of the equation, related to the tax payments levied on the 
industrial output, is adjusted in its turn according to formula (5): 
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where is the level of tax burden on sector k of industry in the economy of 
Russia: 
'
kT
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RT ='                                                                         (6) 
where Rk–tax revenues collected in sector k of industry to consolidated regional 
budgets in Russia, 
Ik–output in sector k of Russia’s industry. 
'
kD –share of output in sector k of region’s industry: 
 ∑= iik I
ID '                                                                     (7) 
where Ii–output in sector k of region’s industry. 
∑ kI – total industrial output in the region. 
Five components of equation (5) are adjusted to take into account the differences 
in the structure of the output of the appropriate sectors of industry according to formula 
(8). 
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where  and  are calculated similarly to  and  above with the only 
difference that revenues and industrial output are related not to sectors of industry, but to 
sub-sectors of industry’s sectors.  
''
mT
''
mD
'
kT
'
kD
The following list shows how those sectors of the economy, sectors and sub-
sectors of industry are related when coefficient K is calculated. 
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1. Industry 
1) Fuel industry 
i. Oil extracting industry 
ii. Oil refining industry 
iii. Gas extracting industry 
iv. Coal industry 
2) Food industry 
i. Liquor and spirit industry 
ii. Tobacco industry 
iii. Fish industry 
iv. Other sub-sectors of food industry 
3) Chemical and petrochemical industry 
i. Chemical industry 
ii. Petrochemical industry 
4) Logging, woodworking, pulp-and-paper industry 
i. Logging industry 
ii. Woodworking industry 
iii. Pulp-and-paper industry 
iv. Wood-chemical 
5) Light industry 
i. Textile industry 
ii. Sewing industry 
iii. Other sub-sectors of light industry 
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6) Electric power industry 
7) Ferrous metallurgy 
8) Machine-building and metal cutting industry 
9) Building materials industry 
10) Microbiology industry 
11) Medical industry 
12) Other sectors of industry 
2. Construction  
3. Transport 
4. Communication 
5. Trade and services rendered to households 
6. Housing and utilities 
7. All other sectors of the economy 
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APPENDIX III 
Table B1  
Growth of Metro Areawide Tax Base 
 
Year Total Tax 
Base in 
Areawide 
Pool 
(millions) 
Total Metro 
C/I Tax 
Base 
(millions) 
% of Total 
C/I Tax 
Base in 
Areawide 
Pool 
Total Metro 
Tax Base 
% of Total 
Tax Base in 
Pool 
 (A) (B) (C)=(A)/(B) (D) (E)=(A)/(D) 
1975 137 2044 6.7 6403 2.1
1980 328 2930 11.2 9363 3.5
1985 1264 5394 23.4 15710 8.0
1990 265 1019 26.0 2097 12.6
1991 `291 1052 27.7 2185 13.3
1992 293 1007 29.1 2103 13.9
1993 289 984 29.4 2039 14.2
1994 277 923 30.0 2004 13.8
1995 241 917 26.3 2065 11.7
1996 260 941 27.6 2184 11.9
1997 275 1015 27.1 2351 11.7
1998 264 941 28.1 2286 11.5
1999 253 917 27.6 2273 11.1
2000 278 980 28.4 2439 11.4
2001 314 1094 28.7 2745 11.4
2002 214 710 30.1 2130 10.0
2003 232 757 30.6 2337 9.9
2004 252 781 32.3 2569 9.8
Source: House Research Department 
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APPENDIX IV 
THE SUMMARY OF MINNESOTA LAND PLANNING ACT (MLPA) 
 
1. Accommodating growth in a flexible, connected and efficient manner. 
- Supporting land-use patterns that efficiently connect housing, jobs, retail 
centers and civic uses. 
- Encouraging growth and reinvestment in centers with convenient access to 
transportation corridors. 
- Ensuring an adequate supply of developable land for future growth. 
2. Slowing the growth in traffic congestion and improving mobility. 
- Improving the highway system, removing bottlenecks and adding 
capacity. 
- Making more efficient use of the highway system by encouraging flexible 
work hours, telecommuting, ridesharing and other traffic management 
efforts. 
- Expanding the bus system and developing a network of new bus and/or 
rail transit ways, based on a thorough cost-benefit analysis. 
3. Encouraging expanded choices in housing locations and types. 
- Allowing market forces to respond to changing market needs, including 
increased demand for town homes and condominiums as baby-boomers 
grow older. 
- Preserving the existing housing stock to help maintain a full range of 
housing choices. 
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- Supporting the production of lifecycle and affordable housing with better 
links to jobs, services and amenities. 
4. Working to conserve, protect and enhance the region's vital natural resources. 
- Encouraging the integration of natural-resource conservation into all land-
planning decisions. 
- Seeking to protect important natural resources and adding areas to the 
regional park system. 
- Working to protect the region’s water resources. 
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